Journal of Health Care Law and Policy
Volume 6 | Issue 1

Article 8

Whose Duty is it Anyway?: the Kennedy Krieger
Opinion and its Implications for Public Health
Research
Diane E. Hoffmann
Karen H. Rothenberg

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/jhclp
Part of the Bioethics and Medical Ethics Commons, and the Health Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Diane E. Hoffmann, & Karen H. Rothenberg, Whose Duty is it Anyway?: the Kennedy Krieger Opinion and its Implications for Public
Health Research, 6 J. Health Care L. & Pol'y 109 (2002).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/jhclp/vol6/iss1/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Health
Care Law and Policy by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

WHOSE DUTY IS IT ANYWAY?: THE KENNEDY KRIEGER
OPINION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH
RESEARCH
DIANE

E.

HOFFMANN,

M.S., J.D.* & KAREN H. ROTHENBERG, M.P.A., J.D.**

On August 16, 2001, the Maryland Court of Appeals issued its Opinion in
Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute, Inc.1 The Court shocked the research
establishment with its scathing characterization of researchers as untrustworthy
individuals willing to inflict harm on vulnerable children or subjects for long-term
gains. The Opinion resulted from two lawsuits alleging lead poisoning of children
enrolled in a study conducted by Kennedy Krieger Institute, Inc. (KKI). The Court
compared the actions of KKI, an internationally known pediatric treatment and
research facility, to a long list of historical instances of exploitation and abuse of
human research subjects including "the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, the international
exposure of soldiers and Navajo miners to radiation, the secret administration of
LSD to soldiers, the injection of chronically ill patients with cancer cells without
their consent, [and] the typhoid experiment conducted by the Nazis at
Buchenwald. ' 2
Moreover, in its 95-page slip Opinion, the Court appeared to hold that "in
Maryland, a parent . . . cannot consent to the participation of a child or other

person on legal disability in nontherapeutic research or other studies in which there
is any risk of injury or damage to the health of the subject.",3 This statement was
particularly alarming to the research community because of its potential to halt
virtually all research in the state involving children.4 The statement, which the
* Diane E. Hoffmann, M.S., J.D., Harvard University. Associate Dean for Faculty and External Affairs
and Director of the Law and Health Care Program at the University of Maryland School of Law.
** Karen H. Rothenberg, M.P.A. Princeton University, J.D. University of Virginia. Dean of the
University of Maryland School of Law and Majorie Cook Professor of Law.
The authors wish to thank their colleagues William Reynolds, Chris Brown, Donald Gifford, Bob
Percival, and Deborah Hellman for their helpful comments on earlierdrafts of this article. They
authors are also grateful to Sarah Richardson and Anuj Shah for their excellent research
assistance.
1. See Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807 (Md. 2001), reconsiderationdenied,
(Oct. 11, 2001).
2. Lisa Ohrin, Children as Research Subjects: Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute, Inc., MIDATLANTIC ETHICS COMMIT-FEE NEWSL. (Law & Health Care Program, U. of Md. Sch. of Law and The
Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee Network, Baltimore, Md.), Fall-Winter 2001, at 4.
3. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 858.
4. Appellee's Motion for Partial Reconsideration and Modification of Opinion at 1, Grimes v.
Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807 (Md. 2001) (No. 128) ("[O]n the day the mandate in this case
issues, hundreds of fully accredited medical research projects now conducted in Maryland will
terminate.").
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Court referred to as a holding, was also puzzling because the issue was raised by
the Court rather than at the request of the parties. 5
Understandably, these facets of the Court of Appeals' Opinion troubled the
research community. 6 However, another aspect of the Court's decision may
actually be more significant. Arguably, the Court's holding regarding the legal
duty of researchers and the scope of that duty, breaks new legal ground and may
have more long-term consequences for researchers and research subjects than
either the statement on parental consent or the Court's harsh characterization of
researchers. The case also raises important questions about where we, as a society,
place legal obligations about who has the role to protect vulnerable citizens from
harm in a country where individuals do not have safe places to live and access to
adequate health and child care.
In this article, we focus on the Court's decision regarding the legal duty of
researchers and the role of tort law in mediating between the need for advances in
public health research and compensating injured research subjects. We begin by
briefly describing the legal basis for establishing a duty of care and the broader
policy and societal justifications for finding such a duty. In the second section of
the article, we summarize the context of the Kennedy Krieger case focusing on the
problem of lead paint poisoning, the objectives of the Kennedy Krieger research,
and the experience of two of the children (the plaintiffs) enrolled in the study.
After describing the history of the case and the Court of Appeals Opinion, we
discuss two possible interpretations of the Court's decision. In this section, we
assert that as a result of confusion in the Opinion regarding the definition of the
research study, the Court's decision may result in a significantly broader duty than
has been imposed historically in the research setting. In particular, the Court's
apparent view that the research risks in this case included the risks of living in lead

5. See concurring opinion by Judge Raker in which she states that "the majority chooses to go far
beyond the narrow question presented in these appeals and addresses a number of ancillary issues in
dicta." Grimes, 782 A.2d 861. See also, Jack Schwartz, The Kennedy Krieger Case: JudicialAnger and
the Research Enterprise,6 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 1, 148 (2002) (characterizing this statement
of the Court as dicta).
6. As a result of a subsequent motion for reconsideration and modification of the original
opinion, researchers were partially relieved. Although the Court denied the motion requesting
reconsideration, it clarified its statement regarding the issue of parental consent. The Court noted that
by "any risk" it meant "any articulable risk beyond the minimal kind of risk that is inherent in any
endeavor." See Order Denying Appellee's Motion for Partial Reconsideration and Modification of the
Opinion, Grimes, 782 A.2d 807 (Md. 2001) (Nos. 128 and 129). The clarification made the statement
more consistent with, although not identical to, the federal rules on research with children. The holding
would not permit parental consent for nontherapeutic research with children above minimal risk. The
federal rules permit such research if it is a "minor increment" above minimal risk. See 45 C.F.R. §
46.406 (2001). And, while the Court's Opinion on this issue is arguably dicta, the clarification
alleviated some of the concerns of researchers who saw the Court's statement as indicative of action the
Court might take in the future, if given the opportunity, or as a recommendation to the legislature to
take action on this issue.
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painted housing is at odds with more traditional views of public health research
which arguably would view the risks as those arising from the collection of dust
and blood samples. This broader view has significant implications for the scope of
the duty required of researchers in what might be described as observational public
health studies.
The Opinion is particularly troubling because it can lead to a significant
burden for researchers in two ways: 1) adoption of the Court's broad interpretation
of what constitutes the research endeavor and its associated risks (a factually based
view), or 2) adoption of the Court's articulated holding in conjunction with a
narrow view of the research project and its associated risks (a legally grounded
perspective). The holding, on its face and as applied to a traditional (narrow) view
of the research, calls for the disclosure of risks that may not be a result of
participation in the research project.
In addition to exploring the contrasting interpretations of the Court and the
researchers regarding what constitutes the research project in this case, we
"deconstruct" the scope of the duty as articulated by the Court and pose a series of
questions as to how such a duty might be discharged and how realistic the Court's
apparent expectations are regarding the duty of researchers. Finally, we discuss
the implications of the Court's broad based duty requirement in the context of
public health studies and raise the question whether the Opinion may ultimately
have negative consequences for the future of public health research in Maryland
and for the compensation of injured parties.
We argue that the ultimate result may lead to paralysis in similar public
health studies and have negative consequences for such research in Maryland as
well as for the compensation of victims of research harms or harms arising from
exposure to public health risks. If, in fact, the Court's decision stifles public health
research, society will suffer because we will not have the data on which to base
needed public health reforms. Moreover, individuals who are harmed as a result of
exposure to noxious substances in the environment or in their homes, whether or
not as a result of participation in a research protocol, may suffer as well. Without
the public health and epidemiological data generated by research studies
individuals will be unable to prove causation and will not be compensated for their
injuries.
I. THE BASIS OF A LEGAL DUTY AND THE GOALS OF TORT LAW
The first element of a successful claim based on negligence requires a
showing that the alleged "tortfeasor" had a legal duty of care to the plaintiff.7 In

7. The duty requirement is consistent with the traditional framework of tort law but arguably
takes sides in an ongoing debate between legal scholars over the appropriateness of duty as an element
in negligence cases. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 7 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001) with
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 7 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002). The other elements necessary for
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general, the law holds that one has a duty to act reasonably to prevent physical
harms to others that might result from one's affirmative acts but, as to inaction, the
law provides that there is "no duty to act affirmatively for the benefit of others in
8'
the absence of some special relationship."
In the case of affirmative acts, most often the duty is characterized as
reaching to foreseeable risks of the conduct in question. 9 When A is injured as a
result of B's failure to act, however, the law is much more forgiving and, absent
certain narrow circumstances, the law provides that one does not have a duty to act
to protect another, i.e., to rescue or be a Good Samaritan. While there may be a
moral duty in such circumstances, our legal system has determined that "the law
0
should not try to enforce unselfishness or make one person serve his fellows."'
Those who support the "hands off" doctrine argue that it is justified by our strongly
engrained societal beliefs in individual freedom of action along with the difficulty
of implementing any "general duty to act for the benefit of others.""
The limited circumstances in which liability for failure to act can attach
include cases involving a contractual relationship or other special relationship
between the parties.' 2 As regards a contractual agreement, an individual may be
liable for harms based on actions he or she promised via contract to perform but
failed to carry out.' 3 A special relationship, beyond contract, has been

establishing negligence include: breach of the duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; harm to the
plaintiff; and evidence that the harm resulted from the defendant's breach. See Richwind Joint Venture
v. Brunson, 645 A.2d 1147, 1151 (Md. 1994).
8. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 227, at 579 (2000). In actuality, this does not mean that
one has no duty to others but that one has no duty to act or behave in an affirmative manner. Id.
9. See HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.2, at 654 (2d ed. 1986). An exception,
carved out of this general rule, occurs when an individual assumes the risk by virtue of consenting to it.
In such cases, the defendant may have no duty to the plaintiff as regards that particular risk and as a
result of the consent the responsibility for any harm is shifted to the plaintiff. DOBBS, supra note 8, §
212 at 540.
10. See HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 9, § 18.6, at 725. The authors assert that such a rule
"represents an attitude of rugged, perhaps heartless, individualism." Id. at 719. However, they also state
that courts and legislatures are making a number of exceptions to this rule. For example, "many states
have statutes requiring motorists to stop and give first aid to those whom they have injured without
regard to questions of fault, and a few courts have held a defendant liable for failure to furnish his
victim reasonable help, though he was faultless in inflicting the original injury, or for failure to take
protective steps to shield plaintiff from a danger that defendant has innocently created." Id. § 18.6, at
721 (footnotes omitted). Those who are critical of the general rule believe that the law should "reflect
virtues like compassion as well as a central interest in liberty." See DOBBS, supranote 8, § 314, at 854.
11. See DOBBS, supra note 8, § 314, at 854 (citing Richard Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2
J. LEG. STUDIES 151, 198 ff. (1973)). Others assert that "a general duty of reasonable rescue would
violate important legal process values and would be unmanageable." Id. (citing James A. Henderson,
Jr., Process Constraints in Tort, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 930 (1982)).
12. Other types of cases where nonaction can result in liability include situations where the
defendant creates the risk of harm or the defendant undertakes "an affirmative action that is either cut
short or performed negligently," e.g., a rescue attempt. See DOBBS, supra note 8, § 314, at 854.
13. While tort law may establish duties beyond what is required under contract, "where
defendant's negligence ends merely in nonperformance of the contract and where defendant is not under
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acknowledged by the courts in a number of specific formal relationships including
common carriers and passengers, employers and employees, owners of land and
persons invited on to their premises, innkeepers and their guests, and custodians
and their wards. 14 While these relationships are well recognized and widely
accepted as generating special duties, the list of special relationships that courts
have acknowledged is much longer. It has included, for example, parent-child,
school-student, and doctor-patient relationships.15
In determining whether a relationship outside of these recognized special
relationships warrants a duty of care, courts have often considered the policy issues
involved and have balanced a number of factors including:
[T]he burden it would put on defendant's activity; the extent to which
the risk is one normally incident to that activity; the risk and the burden
to [the] plaintiff; the respective availability and cost of insurance to the
two parties; the prevalence of insurance in fact; the desirability and
effectiveness of putting
the pressure to insure on one rather than the
16
other, and the like.
The recognition of a duty as a result of any of the above criteria is not, in and
of itself, determinative of liability. The court must also establish the scope of that
duty-what specific actions the defendant was obliged to take given the
circumstances. In cases involving strangers, the duty owed in most cases is to act
as a reasonable person would in similar circumstances.
However, when
individuals are in a special relationship, courts have often imposed a different level
of duty.' 7 For example, in the case of health care providers and patients, the
professional typically owes the duty of care established by his or her peers.18
The rules regarding duty and tort law, more generally, have been established
to accomplish certain societal objectives, chief among them the compensation of
injured parties and the deterrence of undesirable or risky behavior. These
objectives are based on a set of larger societal goals including moral responsibility
any recognized duty to act apart from contract, the courts generally still see no duty to act affirmatively
except the duty based on-and limited by--defendant's consent." See HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra
note 9, § 18.6, at 727 (footnotes omitted).
14. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 314A-314B (1965).
15. See, e.g., Myers v. Quesenberry, 193 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1983), in which physicians were held
subject to a duty to their patient to warn her not to drive in an uncontrolled diabetic condition, and were
held subject to liability to a third person who was injured by the patient's car when it went out of
control, on the theory that such injury was a foreseeable consequence of the breach of the doctors' duty
to the patient.
16. See HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 9, § 18.6, at 730.
17. In some cases the standard has been lower; in others, higher. For example, courts traditionally
held that "landowners owed only the duty to not wantonly or intentionally injure trespassers and
licensees." See DOBBS, supra note 8, § 228 at 581.
18. This duty was sometimes of the highest quality but sometimes woefully unsafe .. ."Id.
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and corrective justice between parties and societal welfare. With regard to
corrective justice, the goal of tort law is to inculcate personal and institutional
responsibility on the part of individuals and organizations for their harmful actions
and to correct wrongs through some form of redress or compensation. This goal,
however, can sometimes conflict with the goal of societal welfare. As a result,
courts will often take into account the social utility of a particular outcome in terms
of its costs and benefits to society when contemplating the need for corrective
justice. 19
II. THE CONTEXT OF THE CASE
A. The Problemof LeadPaintPoisoning
Lead paint continues to be a major public health problem today, despite the
its potential for harm was known as far back as the early 1900,s.20
that
fact
According to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD),
almost one million children under the age of six suffer from elevated lead levels
which, if untreated, could lead to lead poisoning and approximately "one in three
households with young children has significant lead-based-paint hazards.' Lead
contaminated house dust is a major contributor to lead exposure. The lead gets
into the air when house dust becomes contaminated by lead-based paint inside a
home and the paint peels, deteriorates, or flakes. Children typically ingest lead
particles via hand to mouth contact. 22
Authorities state that it is impossible to totally eliminate the risk of lead
poisoning in such houses and that modem lead hazard control methods on average
reduce levels of lead contaminated house dust by about 60%.23 Those most at risk
for lead poisoning are children from low-income families.24 Lead poisoning can
19. Id. § 8, at 12-13.
20. Gerald Markowitz & David Rosner, "Cater to the Children": The Role of the Lead Industry in
a Public Health Tragedy, 1900-1955, 90(1) AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 36, 37 (Jan. 2000). During the first
half of the century other countries restricted the use of lead in paint; however this was not the case in
the United States. Id. at 37. In the 1950s the lead industry started limiting the amount of lead in interior
paints. Id. at 44.
21. OFFICE OF LEAD HAZARD CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF HUD, NAT'L SURVEY OF LEAD AND
ALLERGENS IN HOUSING: FINAL REPORT ES-5 (2001).
22. CDC AND PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., SCREENING YOUNG
CHILDREN FOR LEAD POISONING: GUIDANCE FOR STATE AND LOCAL PUBLIC HEALTH OFFICIALS 13
(1997).
23. PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON ENVTL. HEALTH RISKS & SAFETY RISKS TO CHILDREN,
ELIMINATING CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING: A FEDERAL STRATEGY TARGETING LEAD PAINT
HAZARDS 4 (2000). In addition to exposure from their homes, children may also be exposed to lead
outside of their homes as it exists in soil, dust and drinking water. See NAT'L SURVEY OF LEAD AND
ALLERGENS IN HOUSING: FINAL REPORT, supra note 2 1, at 1-2.
24. For example, among low income children ages 1 - 5, 8.0% have a blood lead level greater than
10 pg/dL compared to 1.0% of high-income children and 1.9% of middle income children. In addition,
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cause permanent brain damage and has been linked to behavioral problems and, in
severe cases, can cause death.25 The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) has
classified blood lead levels in children into categories from "normal" to
"moderately elevated," "highly elevated" and "urgently elevated." At levels
considered moderately elevated, medical interventions include education to reduce
exposure and absorption. At highly elevated levels, education along with a
medical exam and case management are recommended. At urgently elevated
levels, chelation therapy is recommended.26
Although there are several laws that currently affect the sale or rental of
homes with lead paint, 27 at the time of the Kennedy Krieger study, there were few

11.2% of African American children have a blood lead level (BLL) greater than 10 jsg/dL, compared to
2.3% of white children ages 1 -5. SCREENING YOUNG CHILDREN FOR LEAD POISONING: GUIDANCE FOR
STATE AND LOCAL PUBLIC HEALTH OFFICIALS, supranote 22, at 41.
25. Lead is a toxin that affects the central nervous system and is damaging to the developing
nervous system of young children and fetuses. High levels of lead can result in convulsions, mental
retardation, kidney damage, severe anemia, and, at times, death. Lower lead levels can result in reduced
intelligence and short-term memory, damage to the reproductive system, poor hand-eye coordination,
slow reaction times, reduced height, hearing problems, and numerous behavioral problems. See NAT'L
SURVEY OF LEAD AND ALLERGENS IN HOUSING: FINAL REPORT, supranote 21, at 1-1. At a level as low
as 10 pg /dL, reduced IQ, hearing, growth and behavioral problems can occur. See ELIMINATING
CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING, supra note 23, at 11.
26. The CDC classifies blood lead level concentrations in children as follows:
Class I (Normal) - less than or equal to 9 pg/dL
Class IIA (Moderately elevated)-10-14 pg/dL
Class IIB (Moderately elevated)-I 5-19 gg/dL
Class III (Highly elevated)-20-44 tg/dL
Class IV (Urgently elevated)-45-69 pg/dL
Class V (Critically elevated)-greater than or equal to 70 Pg/dL
See Grimes, 782 A.2d 807, 825 n.23 (citing CDC, PREVENTING LEAD POISONING INYOUNG CHILDREN
(Oct. 1, 1991)). The American Academy of Pediatrics recommends that for a blood lead level (BLL)
between 10-14 gg/dL, education should be provided to decrease blood lead exposure; between 15-19
tg/dL, education should be provided to decrease blood lead exposure and lead absorption and an
environmental history should be taken; at levels of 20-44, tg/dL all the previous measures should be
taken and, in addition, a full medical examination and case management should be provided. For any
BLL greater or equal to 45 pg /dL, chelation therapy should be started. At levels of 70 ttg/dL or above,
hospitalization and immediate chelation therapy is required. Am. Academy of Pediatrics, Screeningfor
Elevated Blood Levels, 101 PEDIATRICS 1072, Tbl. 3 (June 1998).
Chelation therapy involves using an agent to bind lead ions thereby removing them from circulation
and lowering the blood lead level while forming a water soluble complex that can be excreted in urine.
See Morri Markowitz, Lead Poisoning:A Diseasefor the Next Millenium, 30(3) CURRENT PROBLEMS
INPEDIATRICS 62, 67 (Mar. 2000).
27. The primary federal law that addresses lead paint abatement is the Residential Lead Based
Paint Hazard Reduction Act (Title X) of 1992. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4851-4856 (2000). The Act, which
became effective in 1994, applies to any housing constructed prior to 1978 if the owner applies for
mortgage insurance or receives housing assistance payments under a program administered by the
Secretary of HUD, or receives more than $5,000.00 in project-based assistance under a federal housing
program. Exceptions include zero bedroom units, housing leased for less than 100 days, housing for the
elderly, housing for the handicapped, and rental housing inspected and determined to be free of leadbased paint. 15 U.S.C. § 2681(17) (2000).
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applicable laws or regulations. At the state level, the relevant law was the
Department of Environment's Procedures of Abating Lead Containing Substances
from Buildings. 28 These regulations, in effect since 1988, do not require that any
homeowner or landlord undertake any lead paint abatement, however, if the
homeowner or landlord does undertake such abatement, the regulations specify the
appropriate procedures and clean up methods. In order to meet the "clearance
standards" for complete lead paint abatement under this law, lead levels in dust
samples must meet the following criteria:
" Floor lead dust levels are below 200 micrograms per square foot;
" Windowsill lead dust levels are below 500 micrograms per square
foot;
* Window well lead dust levels are below 800 micrograms per square
foot; and
Those covered must be given lead hazard information pamphlets and must undergo periodic
risk assessments and interim controls in accordance with a schedule determined by the Secretary.
Specific provisions of the Act include: i. disclosure of known lead-based paint and/or lead-based paint
hazards by persons selling or leasing housing constructed before 1978, which is the phase out year of
residential lead based paint use, and that buyers/renters receive specific information on lead-based paint
as well as information on low-cost tips on identifying and controlling lead-based paint hazards, 42
U.S.C. § 4852d(a) (2000); ii. standards for lead-based paint hazards and lead dust cleanup levels in
most pre-1978 housing and child-occupied facilities, Id.; iii. ensuring that individuals conducting leadbased paint abatement, risk assessment, or inspection are properly trained and certified, 15 U.S.C. §
2682(a)(1) (2000); iv. ensuring that owners and occupants of pre-1978 housing are provided
information concerning potential hazards of lead-based paint exposure before certain renovations are
begun. Under the Act, owners may also be given grants for lead-based hazard reduction. 42 U.S.C. §
4852. Grants must be made available to families below certain income levels and in all cases the
landlord is to give priority in renting units that have undergone lead paint hazard reduction to families
with a child under the age of six years. Id.
At the state level, current laws include the Maryland Reduction of Lead Risk in Housing
Program and the Lead Hazard Reduction Grant Program and Lead Hazard Reduction Loan Program.
MD. ENVIR. CODE ANN., §§ 6-801 -852 (2002); MD. ANN. CODE Art. 83B, §§ 2-140 -1411 (1998
Repl. Vol.) Both were passed by the state legislature in 1994. The Reduction of Lead Risk in Housing
Program requires owners of older residential properties to meet certain risk reduction standards upon
each change in tenancy, including passing a lead dust "clearance test" or undertaking appropriate lead
hazard reduction treatments. MD. ENVIR. CODE ANN., §§ 6-815 (2002). Owners, beginning in 1996,
were also required to provide new tenants with informational pamphlets about how to protect their
families from lead based paint in their home and tenant's rights regarding lead poisoning. § 6-820, §6823. By 2001, owners were required to certify that 50% of their rental units received full risk reduction
treatments, and by 2006, they must certify that 100% of their units have received full risk reduction
treatments. § 6-817. Owners who comply with these and other requirements of the law may be
protected by limited liability in cases against them for lead poisoning. §6-828.
The grant and loan programs were established to assist owners of residential property or child
care centers fund lead hazard reduction activities with an emphasis on activities including the
replacement of windows containing lead-based paint on friction surfaces. MD. ANN. CODE Art. 83B, §§
2-1403 (1998 Repl. Vol.). Criteria for grants include location in an area of the State designated by the
Department to be an area with a concentration of children who have been diagnosed with elevated blood
lead, or residential property constructed before 1950 and families of limited income. MD. ANN. CODE
Art. 83B, §§ 2-1406 (1998 RepI. Vol.).
28. MD. REGS. CODE 26, §§ 02.07.01-02.07.12 (1988).
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* All abated surfaces and all floors
have been treated to provide smooth
29
and easily cleanable surfaces.
B. The R&M Study
Since the early 1980s, the KKI has been at the forefront of efforts to prevent
and treat the harms associated with lead paint poisoning in children. 30 In an effort
to evaluate the effectiveness of selected methods of lead paint abatement, KKI,
with funding from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 3 1 undertook
the Lead Paint Abatement, Repair, and Maintenance Study (R&M Study).32
Beginning in approximately 1992, 33 KKI recruited property owners to participate
in the Study. If they agreed and their housing units met the criteria for
participation, 34 their housing units were randomly assigned a lead abatement level
of 1, 2, or 3 with "three being the most extensive and costly." 35 Each of these
29. Id. § 12; See also Grimes, 782 A.2d at 820 n.13. These standards applied to complete lead
paint abatements and were the basis on which an owner could receive a certificate of lead-free housing.
See MD. REGS. CODE 26, § 16.02.05 (1996). There were no standards for partially abated homes. In
addition to these standards, the City of Baltimore had established abatement regulations for lead paint.
These regulations define a lead-based paint violation and specify methods of abatement and cleanup for
such violations. A violation is defined as, among other things: "the presence of lead-based paint on the
interior or exterior surfaces of any property ... that is easily accessible to a child; or that is cracking,
peeling, chipping, blistering, or flaking or is in an otherwise deteriorated condition: or that is chalking
so that the lead dust generated therefrom is determined by the Commissioner [of the Baltimore City
Health Department] to pose a health hazard ... BALTIMORE, MD., ABATEMENT REGULATIONS FOR
LEAD PAINT § 5.1 (1987).

30. See Joanne Pollak, The Lead-Based Paint Abatement Repair & Maintenance Study in
Baltimore: HistoricFramework and Study Design, 6 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 1, 91 (2002).
31. See Grimes, 782 A.2d at 819. KKI received a $200,000 grant entitled "Evaluation of Efficacy
of Residential Lead Based Paint Repair and Maintenance Interventions" from EPA in 1993. Id.The
project was jointly sponsored by the EPA, the Maryland Department of Housing and Community
Development (DHCD), the Baltimore City Health Department, and the Maryland Department of the
Environment. Id. at 820. According to Joanne Pollak, "In 1990, the EPA, through its Office of
Pollution Prevention and Toxics, issued a work assignment to Battelle Memorial Institute, who [sic] in
turn subcontracted with Kennedy Krieger, directing the design of a "Lead Paint Abatement & Repair
and Maintenance Study in Baltimore." See Pollak, supra note 30 at 96.
32. In his deposition, Mark Farfel, Sc.D., principal investigator of the Study, stated that the reason
for doing the Study was that there was "very little documentation for any type of lead hazard
introduction short of full abatement." Brief for Appellants at 4, Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc.,
782 A.2d 807 (Md. 2001) (No. 1177).
33. Brief for Appellants at 4, Grimes (No. 1177).
34. Criteria for participation included having "been built before 1941, having documented leadbased paint in the unit and elevated levels of lead in dust in at least two sites in the house greater than
the clearance criteria standard in Maryland." See Brief for Appellants at 4-5, Grimes (No. 1177). See
also Grimes, 782 A.2d at 822-23.
35. KKI described the levels of abatement as follows: "Level I intervention included scraping of
peeling and flaking lead-based paint on interior surfaces; limited repainting of some surfaces, wet
cleaning with a trisodium phosphate detergent; and vacuuming with a high efficiency particulate air
vacuum to the extent possible in an occupied house; the provision of an entry way mat; and stabilization
of lead-based paint on exterior surfaces to the extent possible. Level 2 intervention included two key
additional elements: use of sealants and paints to make floors smoother and more easily cleanable, and
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methods of abatement had previously "been demonstrated to reduce lead dust
levels significantly" in affected homes. 36
There were approximately 25 units assigned to each level. In addition, there
were two "control groups"- one that included modem homes (post 1980), and
another that included completely abated homes.37 A total of 108 properties were
enrolled in the study. Property owners received loans from the Maryland
Department of Housing and Community Development to carry out the
abatements.38
After the properties were selected, families were enrolled in the study. The
enrollment procedures varied based on whether the properties were occupied or
unoccupied, and whether the units had been abated prior to the initiation of the
study. For occupied properties, Kennedy Krieger researchers interviewed families
to determine if they met the criteria for enrollment. These included the presence of
one or more children four years of age or younger and "the absence of certain
health issues." 39 If families agreed to participate in the study, the abatements were
performed. During the abatement process, families were asked to leave the
property for several days so as not to be exposed to lead dust.40 For properties that
had not been occupied, the abatements were completed prior to renting the units
and families were approached to enroll in the study after agreeing to rent the unit.
If homes had been abated prior to the initiation of the R&M Study, families were
approached to determine their eligibility for participation and asked of their interest
in participation. 4 1 In all cases, researchers obtained the consent of the parties to
enroll in the study.
During the study period, researchers collected dust samples from the homes
of residents living in the housing who agreed to participate in the Study in order to
assess environmental lead levels. In addition, researchers monitored blood lead
levels of children living in the participating households. According to a published
description of the Study, "[e]levated blood lead levels in the children were to be

in-place window and door treatments to reduce abrasion of lead-painted surfaces. Level 3 added
window replacement and encapsulation of exterior window trim with aluminum coverings as the
primary window treatment, encapsulation of exterior door trim with aluminum, and the use of coverings
on some floors and stairs to make them smooth and more easily cleanable. Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 2-3, Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d
807 (Md. 2001) (No. 1177). See also Grimes, 782 A.2d at 821-22.
36. Robert M. Nelson, Nontherapeutic Research, Minimal Risk, and the Kennedy Krieger Lead
Abatement Study, 23 IRB ETHICS & HUM. RES. 7, 7 (2001).
37. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 2,
Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807 (Md. 2001) (No. 01600); See also Grimes, 782
A.2d at 820.
38. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 821 n.15.
39. See Pollak, supra note 30 at 99.
40. Id. at 100.
41. For a more complete description of the enrollment process see Pollak, supra note 30 at 98101.
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reported to the family immediately; environmental lead levels were to be provided
as well, but less promptly, allegedly due to delays caused by EPA testing
specifications. 42
C. The Experiences of Myron Higgins and Ericka Grimes
On May 13, 1994, Catina Higgins, mother of Myron Higgins, leased an
apartment at 1906 E. Federal Street in Baltimore City from Lawrence Polakoff.
Polakoff had been approached by KKI and agreed to have his property undergo a
level 2 abatement. The abatement, as described above, was completed prior to the
unit being rented. Ms. Higgins learned of the unit from an ad in the paper and was
interested in renting it because of the rental fee.43 Prior to moving into the unit,
Ms. Higgins was asked to review and sign a lease addendum which stated that
"eating, chewing paint or plaster or household dust that contains lead, by children,
especially under 6 years of age, may cause severe illness." 44 The document also
advised her to notify the owner or landlord if she found any "chipping or peeling
paint throughout the property, ' 45 and to include on the lease addendum any areas
of the unit containing "loose, chipping, or flaking paint., 46 Ms. Higgins signed the
addendum and did not include any statement about the condition of the paint.47
Viola Hughes, mother of Ericka Grimes, moved into an apartment located at
1713 N. Monroe Street in Baltimore City in the summer of 1990. The unit had
been "completely abated" as of October 15, 1990.48 Ericka Grimes was born on
49
May 30, 1992, approximately two years later.
At the time Higgins and Hughes were approached by KKI to participate in the
R&M Study, Myron Higgins was approximately four and one-half years old, and
Ericka Grimes was ten months old. KKI researchers asked each parent to sign an
informed consent form stating that lead poisoning in children was a problem in
Baltimore City, that their housing unit had undergone or would undergo lead
42. Robert M. Nelson, supra note 36, at 7. Nelson also reports that the "blood lead levels declined
in nearly all the children involved in the study, significantly for some. Based on the demonstrated
effectiveness of affordable lead abatement methods, the program has been replicated in 13 other cities."
Id.See Pollak, supra note 30 at 99, citing U.S. EPA, PUB. NO. 747-R-005, LEAD-BASED PAINT
ABATEMENT AND REPAIR AND MAINTENANCE STUDY IN BALTIMORE: FINDINGS BASED ON Two YEARS

OF FOLLOW-UP 25 (1997).
43. The ad listed the property at a rental of $315/month. Brief for Appellants at 3, Grimes (No.
1177). See also Grimes, 782 A.2d at 827.
44. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 4, Grimes (No.
1177).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 5.
47. Id.
48. Plaintiffs disputed this fact. Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment and In Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, at E. 50, Grimes v.
Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807 (Md. 2001) (No. 01600).
49. Grimes 782 A.2d at 824.
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abatement in order to reduce exposure to lead but that the abatement would not
completely eliminate exposure to lead. 50 Furthermore, KKI, through the form,
sought permission to collect dust samples from their homes and blood samples
51
from their children.
As part of the study, KKI obtained dust samples from each unit on three to
six separate occasions and collected blood samples from each child on three
separate occasions.52 Catina Higgins was informed after the second and third dust
50. Prior to asking Ms. Higgins to sign the consent form, a member of the research team was
instructed to say: "1 am here because your house had special repairs done before you moved here in
order to reduce exposure to lead in paint and dust. We are interested in finding out how well the repairs
worked. Can we talk about this study with you and/or the head of the household?" Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of Response by Kennedy Krieger Institute to Plaintiffs Opposition to
KKI's Motion for Summary Judgment at 5, Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807 (Md.
2001) (No. 24C-95-066067).
51. The form explicitly stated:
As you may know, lead poisoning in children is a problem in Baltimore City and other
communities across the country. Lead in paint, house dust, and outside soil are major sources
of lead exposure for children. Children can also be exposed to lead in drinking water and
other sources. We understand that your house is going to have special repairs done in order
to reduce exposure to lead in paint and dust. On a random basis, homes will receive one or
two levels of repair. We are interested in finding out how well the two levels of repair work.
The repairs are not intended or expected to completely remove exposure to lead.
We are now doing a study to learn about how well different practices work for reducing
exposure to lead in paint and dust. We are asking you and over 100 other families to allow us
to test for lead in and around your homes up to eight times over the next two years, provided
that your house qualifies for the full two years of study. Final eligibility will be determined
after the initial testing of your home. We are also doing free blood lead testing of children
aged 6 months to 7 years, up to eight times over the next two years. We would also like you
to respond to a short questionnaire every 6 months. This study is intended to monitor the
effects of the repairs and is not intended to replace the regular medical care your family
obtains.
BENEFITS:
To compensate you for your time answering questions ... we will mail you a check in the
amount of $5.00. In the future we would mail you a check in the amount of $15 each time the
full questionnaire is completed. The dust, soil, water, and blood samples would be tested for
lead at the Kennedy Krieger Institute at no charge to you. We would provide you with
specific blood-leadresults. We would contactyou to discuss a summary of house test results
and steps thatyou could take to reduce any risks of exposure [emphasis added.] Grimes, 782
A.2d at 824-25.
52. The chart below indicates when the samples were taken and when each parent was notified of
the results.
Samples:
Dust
Dust
Blood
Blood
Plaintiff:
Date Taken:
Date Parent Notified:
DateTaken:
Date Parent Notified:
Higgins
May 17, 1994
June 24, 1994
June 8, 1994
July 18, 1994**
Higgins
July 25, 1994
Sept.14, 1994*
July 29, 1994
Aug. 2, 1994**
Higgins
Nov. 3, 1994
Feb. 7, 1995*
Nov. 9, 1994
Dec. 6, 1994**
Grimes
Mar. 9, 1993
Dec. 16, 1993*
Apr. 9, 1993
Apr. 9, 1993***
Grimes
Aug. 23, 1993
Dec. 17, 1993
Sept. 15, 1993 Sept. 29,1993**
Grimes
Mar. 9, 1994
May 19, 1994
Mar. 25, 1994 Mar. 28,1994**
Grimes
Sept. 19, 1994
Oct. 28, 1994
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samplings that several samples53taken from her unit had lead levels above the
clearance levels for lead in dust.
The initial dust samples collected in the Hughes/Grimes household, on March
9, 1993, revealed elevated lead levels (above clearance levels for fully abated
homes) in dust in the home but Ms. Hughes was not informed of these results until
nine months later.
KKI informed Ms. Higgins and Ms. Hughes of the blood lead level results
verbally and in writing. Myron Higgins' initial results were collected
approximately 3-4 weeks after moving into the unit. At that time, his blood lead
level was "moderately elevated" by CDC standards at 17.5 micrograms per
deciliter of blood (.tg/dL). The results of his second test were "highly elevated" at
21 ig/dL. The results of his third test, although still in the moderately elevated
range, showed a decline in lead levels to 10.5 1tg/dL.54 After the first elevated
level, Ms. Higgins was told that she should contact her physician about the results.
KKI also reported that the Baltimore City Health Department was notified of
Myron's elevated lead levels.
Although Ericka Grimes' initial blood lead levels were normal, her second
and third results were elevated.55 On October 3, 1993, Kennedy Krieger informed
the state Lead Registry of Ericka Grimes' elevated test results. The Registry then

Grimes

Apr. 18, 1995 1 July 19, 1995

Grimes
Nov. 13, 1995 Jan. 18, 1996
* Plaintiffs informed that home had "hot spots" where lead level was "higher than might be
found in a completely renovated [abated] house." Grimes, 782 A.2d at 825-28.
Elevated blood lead levels found. Id. at 825-26, 828 (Md. 2001).
*** The exact date of the notification is unclear from the file. While, the Opinion states the
date at April 9, 1993, Appellee's Brief states that Ms. Hughes received notice of the first
result (placing Ericka Grimes' blood lead level in the "normal range") on September 29,
1993. See id. at 825. See also Brief of Appellee at 8, Grimes (No.128).
53. It later became apparent that there was a difference of opinion between Higgins and KKI as to
whether the samples collected at the initial testing were above the clearance levels and plaintiffs were
not informed of high levels at that time. According to Appellant's brief, "lead dust in the second level
floor area of the home increased from 75 to 742 micrograms per square foot, the first story floor area
increased from 65 to 1684 micrograms per square foot, the first story window well increased from 27 to
4470 micrograms per square foot, and the second floor window well increased from 110 to 8807
micrograms per square foot." Brief for Appellants at 7, Grimes (No. 1177). According to KKI, the
"elevated" levels were based on a different dust collection method than the method used to establish the
clearance levels. The higher levels were a result of an "experimental Cyclone vacuum dust collector.
These samples all gave results, which indicated that the lead present therein was far above the accepted
Maryland clearance levels ....
However, according to KKI, the clearance levels are based on dust
wipe collection not Cyclone collection. KK1 presented evidence that additional samples were collected
by the dust wipe technique and that these samples indicated a presence of lead below the Maryland
clearance levels." Grimes 782 A.2d at 828 n.28.
54. Brief for Appellants at 12, Grimes (No. 1177).
55. Ericka Grimes' initial results were normal at 9 pig/dL. Her second results were elevated at 32
jtg/dL and her third results were elevated at 22 psg/dL. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 4, Grimes (No. 01600). See also Grimes, 782 A.2d at
825.
**
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notified the Baltimore City Health Department. The Department "inspected the
property and obtained dust samples on October 13, 1993." According to KKI, "no
elevated levels of lead were found in these samples and the property was
discharged from the Baltimore City Health Department on Nov. 3, 1993" with a
notation that the property was "lead free.''56
III. THE HISTORY OF THE CASE
A. Initiation of the Law Suits
Catina Higgins, on behalf of herself and her son, Myron Higgins, filed suit in
the Circuit Court for Baltimore City in February, 1993, against Lawrence Polakoff,
the owner of the apartment in which she and her son lived. She claimed that, as a
result of Polakoff s negligence in "maintaining, supervising and renting" the
apartment, her son was lead-poisoned.57 Approximately six years later, in April,
1999, Higgins amended her complaint to add KKI and Environmental Services,
Inc., the contractor that performed the abatement, as defendants. In the complaint,
Higgins alleged that KKI referred to the apartment as "lead safe housing" and that
"both Kennedy and Environmental were negligent in undertaking to abate, paint,
and repair the premises prior to and/or during the [minor plaintiffs] occupancy,
and [did] so in an unreasonable, incomplete, unworkmanlike, and/or illegal
manner. ' ' 8 Furthermore, Higgins alleged that "KKI was negligent in failing to
warn her of the lead hazard which KKI and its agents knew or should have known,
or had reason to know, existed in the premises." 9 As a result of this negligence,
Higgins claimed that her son suffered permanent brain damage which had caused a
"learning disability, shortened attention span, impulsivity, hyperactivity, [and]
extreme difficulty reading" and that these problems had led to behavioral and
60
emotional difficulties.

56. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 5,
Grimes (No. 01600). This fact was disputed by plaintiffs in their Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, Grimes (No. 01600).
57. Amendment By Interlineation at 1 1, Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807
(Md. 2001) (No. 1177). "After discovery, the plaintiff added Chase Management, Inc. and CFOD-2
Limited Partnership to the lawsuit as additional owners and operators of the rental property." Brief for
Appellants at I, Grimes (No. 1177). In 1992, prior to Ms. Higgins' moving into the unit, Polakoff
"transferred ownership of the property to CFOD-2, a limited partnership in which Chase was a general
partner." Grimes, 782 A.2d at 829.
58. Amendment By Interlineation 8, Grimes (No. 1177).
59. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 2, Grimes (No.
1177). Subsequently, Lawrence Polakoff filed a cross claim against KKI and Environmental Services,
Inc. seeking indemnity and/or contribution. Id.
60. Amendment By Interlineation 15, Grimes (No. 1177).
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The Grimes case was initiated on March 11, 1999, when Ericka Grimes, by
her mother, Viola Hughes, filed suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against
KKI.61 Grimes alleged that KKI "failed to inform and/or warn" her of lead paint
hazards which it had discovered and "failed to take any action to abate said
hazards" and that she suffered lead paint poisoning as a result of KKI's negligence,
disability, brain injury, and other physical mental
which caused her "permanent
62
and emotional injury."
B. Motionsfor Summary Judgment
In response to the complaints and in the midst of discovery, KKI filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment in both cases, 63 arguing that the plaintiffs had no
cause of action against the defendant because it owed the plaintiff no duty to avoid
the alleged injury. 64 Specifically, KKI asserted that it had no "special relationship"
with the owner or independent contractor that would require it to exercise
"reasonable control over them," 65 had no duty to warn the plaintiffs of latent
defects because such a duty only adheres to the landlord/tenant relationship, 66 and
lastly, had no duty because this was not a doctor/patient relationship.67 Finally
KKI stated that if it owed any duty to the plaintiffs, it was a duty to inform them of
"the nature of the study they were conducting, the purpose of the study and the

61. Complaint and Election For Jury Trial, Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807
(Md. 2001)(No. 01600).
62. Id.
63. The Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on February 24, 2000 in the Higgins case and on
April 19, 2000 in the Grimes case. Motions for Summary Judgment, Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst.,
Inc., 782 A.2d 807 (Md. 2001) (No. 1177) (No. 01600).
64. In support of its argument, KKI stated that "[a] duty can be created by contract, by statute, or
pursuant to a special relationship that exists between the parties, such as a landlord/tenant relationship
or physician/patient relationship" but that no contract or special relationship existed between KKI and
the plaintiffs, nor any controlling statute. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion
to Dismiss at 8, Grimes (No. 01600) (citing to Schweitzer v. Brewer, 280 Md. 430, 440-41, 374 A.2d
347, 353 (1977)). In response to KKI's motion, plaintiff, Ericka Grimes, filed a motion for partial
summary judgment arguing that she was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of whether
the Defendant owed a duty to her. Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Grimes v.
Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807 (Md. 2001) (No. 01600).
65. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 8, Grimes (No.
1177). KKI made this argument in response to the plaintiff's assertion, based on Lamb v. Hopkins, 303
Md. 236, 492 A.2d 1297 (1985), that KKI "took charge of the owner and the independent contractor"
and was therefore under a duty to "exercise reasonable control over them." Plaintiff's Memorandum of
Points and Authorities at 7, Grimes (No. 1177).
66. Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 7, Grimes (No. 1177) (citing to New
Summit Association v. Nissel, 73 Md. App. 351, 533 A.2d 1350 (1987)).
67. Id.
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extent of [their] involvement" and of any risks associated with their participation in
the study. According to KKI, it fulfilled each of these requirements.68
C. The Trial Court Decision and the Appeal
In April, 2000 and July, 2000, respectively, the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City granted KKI's motions in both cases. In Higgins, the judge concluded that
KKI was an "institutional volunteer in that community trying to help citizens," and
thus owed no legal duty to the plaintiff or her son. 69 Subsequently, appellants filed
appeals in the Court of Special Appeals.7 ° On February 8, 2001, prior to
consideration by the Court of Special Appeals, the Court of Appeals issued a Writ
of Certiorari, thus bypassing a hearing before the Court of Special Appeals. 7'
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
A. The Holding
The Court of Appeals wrote its opinion in the context of reviewing the
decisions of the two trial courts that granted KKI's motions for summary
judgment.72 As a result, the factual record was not complete and the Court viewed
all the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellants.73 This procedural
posture opened the door to the Court's one-sided and arguably exaggerated fact
presentation. By winning at the trial court level on summary judgment, KKI left
itself vulnerable, to some extent to these skewed factual assumptions.
68. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Response by Kennedy Krieger Institute
to Plaintiffs Opposition to KKI's Motion for Summary Judgment at 10, Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc.,
782 A.2d 897 (Md. 2001) (No.1177).
69. Grimes, 782 A.2d. at 832 (citing to the trial court's bench opinion). Approximately two months
later, on May 4, 2000, Plaintiff Higgins filed a Motion for Reconsideration. See Plaintiffs Motion for
Reconsideration, Grimes (No. 1177). On May 25, 2000, the Circuit Court denied this motion without a
hearing. Order, Grimes (No. 1177).
70. Catina Higgins filed her appeal on July 20, 2000 and Ericka Grimes filed her appeal on July
26, 2000. See Notice of Appeal, Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807 (Md. 2001) (No.
95066067/CL193461) and (No. 24-C-99-000925). In addition, both plaintiffs dismissed their claims
against their respective landlords and owners of the property in order to take an immediate appeal.
71. Grimes 782 A.2d at 826. In addition to briefs prepared by appellants (Grimes and Higgins)
and appellees (KKI), amicus briefs were prepared by the Public Justice Center (PJC), in collaboration
with the National Health Law Program, and The East Harbor Village Center and by the National Center
for Lead-Safe Housing. Brief of Amici Curiae The Public Justice Center, The National Health Law
Program, and The East Harbor Village Center, Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807
(Md. 2001)(No. 129).
72. In its Opinion, the Court of Appeals noted that this was a case of first impression and that it
found only one case in state or federal courts that was "fairly close on one point" to the issues addressed
in this case. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 811, 855 (referring to the case of T.D. v. New York State Office of
Mental Health, 650 N.Y.S.2d 173 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
73. Id.at 821 n.12; See also Ashton v. Brown 660 A.2d 447, 452 (1995) (explaining the standard
of review for decisions based on a motion for summary judgment).
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Consistent with this posture, the Court adopted the question at issue as
phrased by appellants in the Higgins case:
Was the trial court incorrect in ruling on a motion for summary
judgment that as a matter of law a research entity conducting an
ongoing non-therapeutic scientific study does not have a duty to warn a
minor volunteer participant and/or his legal guardian regarding dangers
present when the researcher has knowledge of the potential
for harm to
74
danger?
the
of
unaware
is
subject
the
and
subject
the
This phrasing is key in determining the significance of the Court's holding.
The Court concluded that the trial court erred in granting the defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds that "a legal duty normally exists
75
between researcher and subject and in all probability exists in the cases at bar,"
and that "the consents of the parents in these cases under Maryland law constituted
contracts creating duties. 76
While the issue of the existence of a duty was the focus of the Court's
decision, this was not particularly significant. In fact, in a supplemental brief to
the Court, appellees agreed that a duty did exist but disagreed as to the scope of the
duty.77 As a result of the Court's holding that a duty could exist in such
circumstances, it remanded the cases to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City to
determine whether "a special relationship, or other relationships arising out of
agreements, giving rise to duties existed between KKI and both sets of
appellants., 78 Because the Court found that a duty did exist as a result of the
"contracts" between the parties and that a duty might exist as a result of a special
relationship, 79 it would appear that the task of the lower court on remand is to
determine whether a special relationship exists in these cases that gives rise to
duties going beyond those established by the informed consent agreements, i.e., the
contracts, or beyond the federal regulations regarding research with human
subjects.

80

74. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 818. The Court also recounted appellants' contentions that KK1 was
negligent because KKI breached its duty to: "(1) design a study that did not involve placing children at
unnecessary risk; (2) inform participants in the study of results in a timely manner; and (3) to
completely and accurately inform participants of the research study of all the hazards and risks involved
in the study." Id. at 841.
75. Id. at 818.
76. Id.
77. Supplemental Brief of Appellee at 1-2, Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807
(Md. 2001) (No. 129).
78.
79.
80.
relevant

Grimes, 782 A.2d at 819.
See infra text accompanying notes 102-103.
In fact, the court states that while federal or state "conditions or recommendations" may be
to whether a breach of contract or duty occurred, they "have no limiting effect on the issue
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B. The Court's Reasoning
In its legal analysis, the Court quoted extensively from Maryland case law
that addresses the issue of duty8' and focused predominantly on the relationship
between the parties. In its consideration of whether a special relationship between
the parties existed, the Court considered the consent agreement and the federal
regulations governing research with human subjects. Before embarking on this
analysis, however, the Court stated that although a special relationship between
researcher and subject has not been recognized in the Maryland Code or in prior
Maryland cases, "evidence in the record suggests that such a relationship involving
a duty or duties would ordinarily exist, and certainly could exist, based on the facts
and circumstances of each of these individual cases. ' 2
With respect to the consent agreement, the Court appeared to say that it
created all the elements of a contract (mutual assent, offer, acceptance and
consideration) and as such imposed duties on each of the parties.83 Furthermore,
the Court found that the information provided in the consent agreement was
inadequate and, in fact, that the consent was "not valid because full material
information was not furnished to the subjects or their parents. 84 The Court
suggested that full material disclosure in this case would have included a statement
that "the researchers anticipated that, as a result of the experiment, it was possible
85
that there might be some accumulation of lead in the blood of the children."
As regards the relationship between the parties, the Court emphasized the role
of KKI in creating and conceptualizing the study and contrasted it with a research
study where data is collected retrospectively, stating:
As opposed to compilation of already extant statistics for purposes of
studying human health matters, the creation of study conditions or
protocols or participation in the recruitment of otherwise healthy
subjects to interact with already existing, or potentially existing,
whether, at law, legal duties, via contract or special relationships" are created in Maryland in
experimental nontherapeutic research involving Maryland children." Grimes, 782 A.2d at 820.
81. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 842 (citing to Walpert, Smullian & Blumenthal, P.A. v. Katz, 762 A.2d
582, 589 (2000); Jacques v. First Nat'l Bank, 515 A.2d 756, 759 (1986)).

82. Id.
83. The Court describes the duties of KKI for example, as including: (1) financial compensation to
appellants for their participation in the study; (2) the collection and analysis of lead dust samples from
appellants' homes; (3) discussion of the results of the lead tests with appellants and steps that could be

taken that could reduce exposure to lead; and (4) collection of blood samples from children in the
household and provision of results to appellants. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 843.

In exchange, appellants

agreed to (1)allow KKI into their homes to collect dust samples; (2) periodically fill out questionnaires;
and (3) allow the children's blood to be drawn, tested and used in the study. Id. Considerations, thus,
included "money, food coupons, trinkets, bilateral promises, blood to be tested in order to measure
success." Id.
84. Id. at 844.
85. Id.
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hazardous conditions, or both, for the purpose of creating statistics from
which scientific hypotheses can be supported, would normally warrant
or create such special relationships as a matter of law.86
The Court also discussed the role of the federal regulations on research with
human subjects 87 in creating a special relationship.8 8 The Court quoted from the

regulations regarding informed consent emphasizing the provisions that state that
"an investigator shall seek ... consent only under circumstances that provide the
prospective subject or the representative sufficient opportunity to consider whether
or not to participate and that minimize the possibility of coercion or undue
influence," 89 and that each subject must be provided with any new findings
"developed during the course of the research which may relate to the subject's
willingness to continue participation ....90
The Court further pointed to the federal regulations that directly address
research with children, in particular the provision regarding nontherapeutic
research that presents greater than minimal risks, i.e., those beyond which a child
confronts in every day life. 91 Such research requires approval by the Secretary of
the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). The Court concluded that
the research did not comply with the federal regulations as, according to the Court,
"there clearly was more than a minimal risk involved, ''92 and there was no

86. Id.at 846.
87. These regulations require, among other things, that any covered research be approved by an
Institutional Review Board (IRB), a multidisciplinary committee often affiliated with an academic
research institution and composed of researchers and outside volunteers established to ensure
compliance with the federal rules regarding research with human subjects. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.107- 45.109
(2001). Furthermore, informed consent must be obtained from all subjects. See id.§ 46.116. In the
case of children, their parent or guardian must give consent. Id.§§ 46.401 - 46.409.
Covered research includes any research that is conducted or supported by a Federal
Department or Agency, 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a)(1); or subject to regulation by a federal department or
agency, 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a)(2); or research conducted by an institution that has a compliance
assurance with a federal agency or department, 45 C.F.R. § 46.103(a). In order to approve a research
protocol, an IRB must determine that risks to human subjects will be minimized "by using procedures
which are consistent with sound research design and which do not unnecessarily expose subjects to
risk." 45 C.F.R. § 46.11l(a)(1). Moreover, an IRB must review the informed consent form that the
researcher will use. 45 C.F.R. § 46.115(a)(1). The form, among other things, must include an adequate
description of the research and its purpose, a description of the procedures to be followed, all
"reasonably foreseeable risks," and "any benefits to the subject or to others which may reasonably be
expected from the research." 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a). The regulations also address research with children
and provide more detailed rules regarding allowable risk and consent procedures. See 45 C.F.R. §
46.401-.409 (2001).
88. Given that EPA funded the study, it was subject to the federal rules. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101
(2001).
89. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 847 (quoting45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2001)).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 848 n.38 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 46.407(b) (2001)).
92. Id.at 848.
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indication in the record that KKI had sought approval from the Secretary.93 The
Court also concluded that under the federal regulations, a researcher has a duty to
inform its subjects of all reasonably foreseeable risks. 94 The Court ended its
analysis of the role of the federal regulations by stating that in Maryland, the duty
of informed consent established by federal regulation may, depending on the facts,
create a "duty of care [under state law] arising out95of the unique relationship that is
researcher-subject, as opposed to doctor- patient."
In a separate section, the Court addressed the "ethical appropriateness" of the
research.96 Here it relied on the Nuremberg Code, the Declaration of Helsinki, and
a recent report of the National Bioethics Advisory Commission.9 From these
documents the Court concluded that "otherwise healthy children should not be the
subjects of nontherapeutic experimentation or research that has the potential to be
harmful to the child" and that it is "first and foremost, the responsibility of the
researcher and the research entity to see to the harmlessness of such nontherapeutic
93. Id.
94. The Court cited to Whitlock v. Duke University, 637 F.Supp. 1463 (M.D. N.C. 1986), affd by,
829 F.2d 1340 (4th Cir. 1987), in which the U.S. District Court of the Middle District of North Carolina
"decided that in determining what duty a researcher owes to a subject of nontherapeutic
experimentation, it would analyze a duty consistent with 45 C.F.R. § 46.116" and that a researcher has
"a duty to inform the subject of all risks that are reasonablyforeseeable." Grimes, 782 A.2d at 848
n.38 (citing Whitlock v. Duke University, 637 F.Supp. 1463, 1471 (M.D. N.C. 1986), afffdby, 829 F.2d
1340 (4th Cir. 1987)). The District Court in Whitlock held, however, that although "a heightened duty
existed between a researcher and an adult research participant," organic brain damage from
decompression experiments was not foreseeable. Id. The decision was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. See id The Court of Appeals distinguished this conclusion from the
facts of the case at bar, asserting that the "risks associated with exposing children to lead-based paint
were not only foreseeable but were well known by KKI, and, in fact, it had to have been reasonably
foreseeable by KKI that the children's blood might be contaminated by lead because the extent of
contamination of the blood of the children would, in significant part, be used to measure the
effectiveness of the various abatement methods." Id.
95. Id. at 849. On this point, the Court also relies on the Nuremberg Code which "speaks strongly
to the existence of special relationships imposing ethical duties on researchers who conduct
nontherapeutic experiments on human subjects." Id.The Court states that the Code was intended to
"be applied internationally" and was "never expressly rejected in this country." The Code "specifically
requires researchers to make known to human subjects of research 'all inconveniences and hazards
reasonably to be expected, and the effects upon his health or person which may possibly come from his
participation in the experiment.' The breach of obligations imposed on researchers by the Nuremberg
Code, might well support actions sounding in negligence in cases such as those at issue here." Id.
96. Id.at 849-52. The Court relied extensively in this part of its Opinion on the Amicus Brief
prepared by the Public Justice Center. The brief focused on public policy and ethical reasons for
establishing a duty on the part of researchers to protect their research subjects from unreasonable harm
and argued that research subjects need legal protection because of (I) potential conflicts of interest
between the goal of the researchers and the health of the human subject; (2) the superior position of the
researchers in terms of expertise regarding potential research risks; and (3) the trust that subjects place
in researchers. Brief of Amici Curiae The Public Justice Center, The National Health Law Program,
and The East Harbor Village Center at 10-12, Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807
(Md. 2001)(No. 129).
97. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 849-52 (citing NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION, ETHICAL AND
POL'Y ISSUES IN RES. INVOLVING HUM. PARTICIPANTS (2000)).
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,98

research." Moreover, "consent of parents can never relieve the researcher of this
duty." 99 The Court also attempted to clarify the relationship between consent and
duty by stating that: "[a] researcher's duty is not created by, or extinguished by, the
consent of a research subject or by IRB approval. The duty to a vulnerable research
subject is independent of consent, although the obtaining of consent is one of the
duties a researcher must perform."' 00
In concluding its discussion of duty, the Court stated that "[t]he study, by its
design, placed and/or retained children in areas where they might come into
contact with elevated levels of lead dust. Clearly, KKI contemplated that at least
some of the children would develop elevated blood lead levels while participating
in the study."''
As a result, it found that the potential harm to children subjects
was "both foreseeable and potentially extreme" and that a "special relationship"
02
exists in "circumstances where such experiments are conducted.'
V. INTERPRETING THE DECISION
A. A GroundbreakingDecision or Simply an Application of Existing Law?
The Court was very clear in its holding that a duty of care may exist between
researchers and subjects in nontherapeutic research studies and went to great
lengths to elaborate on the different legal and ethical bases for such a duty. In
sum, the Court held with respect to the legal underpinnings that:
[I]nformed consent agreements in nontherapeutic research projects,
under certain circumstances, can constitute contracts; and that, under
certain circumstances, such research relationships can, as a matter of
law, constitute "special relationships" giving rise to duties, out of the
breach of which negligence actions may arise [and that] normally, such
special relationships are created between researchers and the human
subjects used by the researchers. Additionally. . . governmental

98. Id. at 850.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 852.

102. Id. The Court further asserts that a special relationship creating special duties between
researcher and subject might also arise as a result of the potential conflict of interest that exists for
researchers who want to ensure reliable research results and must also be concerned with the well being
of their subjects and because of the superior knowledge of the researcher regarding the risks associated
with the research. Id. at 85 1. According to the National Bioethics Advisory Commission, "lg]iven the
gap in knowledge between investigators and participants and the inherent conflict of interest faced by
investigators, participants cannot and should not be solely responsible for their own protection.," Id.
(quoting NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM., ETHICAL AND POL'Y ISSUES IN RES. INVOLVING HUM.
PARTICIPANTS 3-4 (Dec. 19, 2000).
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toward human
regulations can create duties on the part of researchers
103
subjects out of which "special relationships" can arise.
While this holding and the Court's rationale are not surprising, what is
potentially groundbreaking is the scope of the duty the Court appears to endorse. It
is clear under the federal rules regarding research with human subjects that
researchers who fall within this regulatory framework, as KKI did, have a duty to:
1) design a study that minimizes the risks to subjects,' 4 2) obtain adequate
informed consent from subjects,10 5 and 3) tell their subjects of "any new findings
developed during the course of the research which may relate to the subject's
willingness to continue participation.', 0 6 These duties are straightforward and
widely accepted. However, duties going beyond these requirements, as implied in
this case, have generally not otherwise been established.
The Court's phrasing of the duty in the question presented as a "duty to warn
[research subjects] regarding dangers present when the researcher has knowledge
07
of the potential for harm to the subject and the subject is unaware of the danger,"
appears unique in its apparent inclusion of situations where the duty is not based
on risks that have arisen as a result of participationin the research. As written,
the statement seems to include preexisting risks to the individual subject, which the
researcher discovers, that are not caused by participation in the research study.
Rather, the risks become known by the researcher during the course of the
investigation and may not be known by the subject. In fact, the Court stated that a
study in which subjects will interact with "already existing, or potentially existing
hazardous conditions" is one in which special relationships would normally be
created. 108
Imposing a "duty to warn" raises questions as to what the researchers should
have told the subjects at the start of the study as well as whether the researchers
had a duty to inform the subjects much earlier than they did of the results of the
dust sample tests. A broad interpretation of such a duty would mean that the
researchers: 1) had a duty to warn of risks not necessarily created by the study; and
2) had an obligation to inform subjects of the dust and blood sample test results as
soon as possible so that subjects could act on the knowledge conveyed, similar to
the obligation that would be imposed on a physician reporting clinical test results
to a patient. If this broader duty is what the court had in mind, the case breaks new

103. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 858. The Court stated that the question of whether such a relationship
existed was a matter of fact for the trial court rather than a matter of law.
104. Id. at 841, 851-52.
105. Id. at 847 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a) (2001).
106. Id. (citing 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(b)(5) (2001).
107. Id. at 818.
108. Id. at 846.
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ground by imposing an obligation on researchers that has not clearly been
09
established elsewhere.'
The holding apparently would require that researchers disclose risks related
to a subject's living situation, not necessarily to the research study. This would
mean, for example, in the case of researchers conducting a study on the impact of
radon on children, that if the researchers found high levels of radon in or around
the children's home that might be harmful, they would have a duty to inform, and
perhaps educate, the children and their parents about the potential risks of exposure
to radon. Arguably, they would further be required to "warn" the parents each
time they obtained a radon reading that was considered potentially harmful to
individuals/children living in the area. This set of facts is clearly different from a
situation where the researchers are deliberately exposing children to a potentially
harmful substance, for example, making them inhale oxygen mixed with different
levels of lead dust or involving them in a study where they are testing the efficacy
of a new drug.
While this interpretation of the Court's Opinion (that is, a duty to warn of
harms arising outside the research protocol and in a timely manner) seems
plausible simply by reading the text of the question posed, a different (less far
reaching) interpretation is also possible depending on how one defines the research
project and its related risks. If the research risks are defined to include the risks of
living in housing with lead paint, as the Court appears to define them, the holding
is not significant because the Court is simply requiring the researchers to inform
subjects of the research-related risks. However, if the research is defined more
narrowly, and the risks confined to those arising from collecting dust and blood
samples, the holding would have considerable import because the required
disclosure would include risks arising outside of the research protocol. In this
case, however, the outcome (discharge of the duty) may be the same under either
scenario-disclosure of the risks of living in housing with partially abated lead
paint.
B. Conflicting Interpretationsof the Research
1. The Court's View - A Different Paradigm?
The ambiguity as to the significance of the holding lies in different
perspectives on when the research protocol began and what constituted the
research interventions. The Court seems to believe that the research commenced
when KKI obtained the agreement of the non-profit entity that owned or managed
low income housing in Baltimore City to participate in the project by seeing that

109. In its brief to the Court of Appeals, KKI argued that appellants were asking the Court to
"create an entirely new definition of duty which would dramatically change the landscape of tort law"

and that this would not be "in accordance with Maryland law, common sense, or the best interests of
our society." Brief for Appellee at 26, Grimes (No. 129).
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different units received different levels of abatement." 0 The Court refers to "the
very inappropriateness of the research itself,"'11 implying that KKI intentionally
exposed young children to potentially harmful levels of lead dust, much as if they
gave them a new drug to test for safety and efficacy. The Court does not view KKI
as studying the impact of lead paint on families who voluntarily moved into a unit
that had some level of lead paint abatement done or who lived in a unit that
subsequently received some level of abatement. Under the Court's broad view of
the research, the families were part of the study when they moved into the units or
when a decision was made to include a unit in the study. Furthermore, because
KKI was the overall "designer" of the project and "orchestrated"] 2 each of its
various components, it had a duty to the subjects at a much earlier stage than that
understood by the researchers. The Court adopted appellants view that
[A]lthough the plaintiffs unwittingly moved into the home not knowing
it was part of experimental research, Kennedy set this experiment into
motion, solicited this specific lead infested property to be a part of the
experiment, initiated the limited and incomplete type of repair that was
to be performed on the property, set up a Federal grant mechanism to
pay for the repairs, encouraged the landlord to lease the property to a
family with a young child, and then waited for the minor plaintiff to
move into the home in order to solicit the child's participation in the
experiment. As a result of Kennedy's actions, and in light of the
apparent risk of its conduct, at a minimum it owed the plaintiffs a duty
to fully warn of risks known to Kennedy and unknown to the plaintiffs.
113

As a result, KKI should have contacted the families before they moved into
the units, or before they agreed to have any abatement performed if already living
in the unit, and informed them of the risks of living in a home with any lead
paint. 1 4 Appellants argued that KKI, based on its knowledge and the fact that it

110. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 812.
111. Id. at 815.
112. Appellants argued that KKI "orchestrated the ... study that resulted in injury to the appellants,"
and, as a result, appellee's argument that duty in this case would be based on the existence of a special
relationship is misplaced. Supplemental Brief for Appellants at 8, Grimes (No. 129). Instead, the
appellants argued that the basis for establishment of a duty is foreseeability. Id. at 10.
113. Brief for Appellants at 25, Grimes (No. 1177).
114. In their Argument, appellants asserted that KKI had a legal obligation to protect the minor
research subjects from "foreseeable harm which it knew was inherent in its experiment." Brief for
Appellants at 14, Grimes (No. 1177). More specifically, appellants argued that KKI owed a "duty of
full disclosure as to all the risks associated with participation in its research experiment in order for the
research subjects to make a reasonable and informed judgment as to whether they wanted to participate
in the Study," as well as a "continuing duty to wam them of additional risks and hazards when these
risks came to the attention of Kennedy during the course of the research experiment." Id. at 14-15.
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"set into motion the act of making repairs to the property," '" 5 should have foreseen
the potential harms to the children living in the units and thus had "an obligation to
inform them of all risks and hazards at the beginning and throughout the course of
16
the study."''
The terms "orchestrating," "designing," and "setting into motion" were
significant in the description of KKI's role. By adopting this characterization of
KKI's part in the broader effort of having landlords perform some level of lead
abatement on their property, the researchers can be more easily thought of as the
entity that placed the subjects at risk, thus justifying imposing on them a duty to
warn.
Key to an understanding of the holding is the realization that the Court's view
of the research-related risks included exposure to lead in dust in the subjects'
homes. This view is conveyed in the way in which the Court refers to the research
risks. The Court wholly adopted the appellant's perspective that Kennedy owed
plaintiffs a duty to explain in full and complete detail the "true" purpose of the
study, and all foreseeable risks inherent in "the research." This included all harm
that might result to the children as a result of "the research," and even the
knowledge that "the research" was experimental and untested and that
unforeseeable risks might occur, so that the subjects or their parents fully
comprehended and appreciated the harmful situation in which they were
potentially placing their young children." 7 Through this language, the Court
implies that the researchers had a duty to inform the tenants of the risks of living in
8
housing with moderately elevated lead levels."

115. Brief for Appellants at 16, Grimes (No. 1177).
116. Supplemental Brief for Appellants at 2, Grimes (No. 1177).
117. Brief for Appellants at 21, Grimes (No. 1177).
118. The subjects were told when they rented the units that they were living in houses that had been
painted with lead based paint and to tell the landlord of any areas where paint was chipping. The Public
Justice Center, et. al., stated in their amicus brief that:
[T]he family was not informed that the unit was part of a research project [until] after they
had already moved into the test property. KKI did not disclose the level of abatement that
had been done to the home, did not identify what was experimental about that abatement
level, and did not wam about the specific areas that had not received any abatement (such as
basements that had flaking and chipping lead paint.) KKI did not explain that it was
unknown whether the experimental abatement level would prevent the child from developing
lead poisoning. Indeed, KKI did not even inform the parents that their children ran the risk of
being lead poisoned due to [sic] the presence of lead in the house or the experimental
abatement level being tested. KKI did not explain the serious brain and health damage that
lead paint could cause to preschool-aged children.
Brief of Amici Curae The Public Justice Center, The National Health Law Program, and The East
Harbor Village Center at 27, Grimes (No. 129).
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2. A Conspiracy Theory?
The Court's sweeping characterization of the research study and the role of
KKI in designing the larger initiative is complemented by a harsh tone and highly
skeptical view of the beneficent nature of the research enterprise. While the
expansive view of the research may be due to review under the summary judgment
standard, this does not explain the Court's highly critical view of the researchers.
The language of the Court paints a picture of a conspiracy between the landlords
and the researchers and is particularly telling of its distrust of the research
establishment. For example, it states that the researchers "required" certain homes
to have only partial lead abatement; that they "required" the landlords to rent the
premises to families with young children; that they would be measuring the extent
"to which the theretofore healthy children's blood became contaminated with
lead."" 9 Furthermore, they characterized the researchers as "enticing" the subjects
to living in, or remaining in, "potentially lead-tainted housing," and "intentionally"
subjecting them to a research program which contemplated "the probability, or
even the possibility, of lead poisoning .... 11120
Overall, the Court characterized the purpose of the study as finding a "less
than complete level of abatement that would be relatively safe, but economical, so
that Baltimore landlords with lower socio-economical rental units would not
abandon the units,"' 2 1 rather than a purpose of improving the safety of housing
with lead paint. In describing the recruitment of subjects into the study, the Court
also casts the researchers in a dark light stating that the researchers were motivated
to enroll individuals in the study who were likely to remain in the rental unit
because if they did not remain the study results would be of questionable value.
Specifically, the Court states that it would "benefit the accuracy of the test
[results], and thus KKI, the compensated researcher, if children remained in the
houses over the period of the study even after the presence of lead dust in the
houses became evident."' 22 The Court, in fact, compares the use of children in the
study to that of canaries used by coal miners in the 2 0 th century to test for carbon
monoxide. 123

119.
120.
121.
122.

Grimes, 782 A.2d at 812.
Id.
at 814.
Id.
at 821.
Id. at 823-24.

123. Id. at 813.

See also DEP'T OF LABOR, MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., A PICTORAL
M
CENTURY: CANARIES, at http:// www.msha.gov/century/canary/canary.htm

WALK THROUGH THE 20

(last visited Oct. 21, 2002). According to the cite, before the availability of modem detection devices
for carbon monoxide, miners used canaries: "Following a mine fire or explosion, mine rescuers would
descend into the mine carrying a canary in a small wooden or metal cage. Any sign of distress from the
canary was a clear signal that the conditions underground were unsafe, prompting a hasty return to the
surface." Id.
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3. The Researchers' View
In stark contrast to the Court's perspective of the research study, the
researchers' view is much more circumscribed. From KKI's vantage point, at least
in the cases at issue, the research did not begin and subjects were not part of a
research protocol until after they moved into the units and agreed to let the
researchers come into their homes to collect dust samples and to draw blood from
their children to test for lead. The researchers viewed the risks of the study as
those arising exclusively from taking the samples. They viewed the risks of lead
poisoning, in contrast, as arising from living in the lead painted units. From their
perspective, the families could have lived in the units whether or not they
participated in the study and would have been exposed to the risks of lead
poisoning whether or not they participated in the research.
Moreover, KKI argued that it did not have responsibility for the renovations
or the rental of the units. 124 As a matter of law, neither KKI nor the property
owners were required to do any renovations or abatement at all. 2 5 However, to the
extent that renovations and abatements were performed, KKI stressed that 26it did
not supervise or direct the independent contractors who performed the work.

124. In its Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Response by KKI to Plaintiff's
Opposition to KKI's Motion for Summary Judgment, KKI stated that it "approached property owners to
ask that they volunteer their properties in Baltimore City for a research study," and that "[t]he owner of
the property was free to collaborate or not collaborate in the study, free to rent or not rent his property at
any time during the course of the study, and was free to rent to whomever he chose. KKI did not dictate
to the owner to whom he should rent the property, nor did KKI refer prospective tenants to the owners
of the properties involved in [the] study." Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Response by Kennedy Krieger Institute to Plaintiffs Opposition to KKI's Motion for Summary
Judgment at 2, Grimes (No. 1177).
125. In its brief to the Court of Appeals, KKI made clear that at the time the R&M Study began,
"there were no Maryland statutes, regulations, standards, or protocols governing the method by which
property owners had to reduce known lead hazards in their rental properties," [Brief for Appellee at 2,
Grimes (No. 128)], with the exception of standards for complete abatement. Id. at n. I ("[T]he Advisory
Council on Lead Poisoning was still in existence, which the General Assembly had created in 1986 to,
among other things, '[s]tudy the means of safe removal of lead paint from the interiors and exteriors of
buildings and make recommendations to the Secretary."'). Moreover, in 1992, the General Assembly
created the Lead Paint Poisoning Commission to "study and make recommendations on means for
inspecting and remediating rental dwelling units and property found to have lead paint on surfaces
accessible to children." Id. at 2-3 (citations omitted). While the argument is true from a regulatory
standpoint, under Maryland common law at the time, a landlord in Baltimore City was liable for harms
resulting from lead poisoning of a tenant if he had reason to know of chipping, peeling or flaking lead
paint and reasonable opportunity to correct the problem. CITE affd by Richwind Joint Venture v.
Brunson, 645 A.2d 1147 (1994). It was not until 1996, however, under the statutory provisions of the
Maryland Reduction of Lead Risk in Housing Program that landlords desiring limited liability were
required to inform tenants of lead paint risks. See supra note 27 and infra note 127 and accompanying
text.
126. Brief for Appellee at 5, Grimes (No. 128). KKI explained that CFOD-2, the owner of the
Federal Street property, "volunteered it to be part of the R&M Study. The property was vacant at the
time and randomly assigned to receive a Level 2 intervention." Moreover, "CFOD-2 hired ERI to
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KKI's view of the research intervention was simply the taking of dust
samples and drawing of blood. In fact, the research institution characterized its
relationship with plaintiffs as one of "an observer" in which it "sought and
received permission to collect information about an existing and evolving
condition which KKI neither created nor controlled." From KKI's perspective, "it
did nothing to introduce Appellants to any hazardous condition."127
Through this lens, the risks associated with exposure to lead were not part of
the research study but were the risks of living in the apartments. To the extent that
someone was responsible for those risks, it was the landlord, not the researchers. 28
In its legal argument, KKI stated that it had no common law or statutory duty to
wam appellants of the lead hazard that existed on the premises that they rented.
Regarding a common law duty, KKI argued that whether it owed any duty to
appellants was "entirely dependent on the nature of the relationship between
them," and that KKI and appellant "did not have a landlord-tenant relationship that
would obligate KMI to inform appellants of hidden hazards in the property,
irrespective of whether KKI knew of the hazards and could foresee harm from
them."12 9 KKI further argued that appellants were trying to impose a duty on KKI
130
that exceeded that of landlords.

perform the intervention work which was done in May 1994." Brief for Appellee at 6, Grimes (No.
129).
127. Brief for Appellee at 14-15, Grimes (No. 129).
128. KKI argued that it was the responsibility of the owner, not KKI, to keep the rented premises in
a "habitable condition," "free of chipping, flaking, and peeling paint." Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of Response by Kennedy Krieger Institute to Plaintiff's Opposition to KKI's
Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, Grimes (No. 1177). But, in addition, KKI pointed out that the
owner was "under no legal obligation to completely eliminate all lead-based paint from the premises,
that there was "no law requiring a complete abatement before a property can be rented." Id. The owner
is only required to remove all flaking, chipping and peeling paint before renting the unit which,
according to KKI, they did. Id. After the owner agreed to have their property used in the research study,
the owner obtained a loan from the Maryland DHCD to finance the cost of the abatement process. Id. at
3. The renovations were performed by an environmental consulting firm, ERI, through a contract with
the owner. Id.
129. Brief for Appellee at 14, Grimes (No. 129). KKI further asserted that it "did not induce
Appellants to move into the Federal Street property and was not involved in establishing Appellants'
tenancy. KKI's relationship with Appellants began after Appellants signed a lease and moved into the
Federal Street property." Id.
130. KKI pointed out that in Baltimore City, landlords may not "lease a dwelling with flaking, loose
or peeling paint," and that no premises may be leased "for human habitation except those that are fit for
human habilitation, i.e. those that are kept in good repair and safe condition as defined by the Baltimore
City Code." Brief for Appellee at 15, Grimes (No. 129) (citing Brown v. Dermer, 744 A.2d. 47 (2000)).
Consequently, KKI stated, "a landlord in Baltimore City has a duty to repair flaking, loose, or peeling
paint of which the landlord knows or has reason to know." Id. However, a landlord in Baltimore City
has no duty to disclose or repair the mere presence of lead paint in the premises that is not in a
dangerous condition, i.e., flaking, loose, or peeling." Brief of Appellee at 15, Grimes (No. 129) (citing
Richwind Joint Venture v. Brunson, 355 Md., 645 A.2d 1147 (1994); and Scroggins v. Dahne, 645
A.2d 1160 (1994)).
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According to the researchers, the risks of exposure to lead in dust would have
existed whether or not the plaintiffs agreed to participate in the research
protocol.13' KKI recognized its duty to provide adequate informed consent but
argued that the "law requires informed consent before an actor does something to a
person that the person would not otherwise have had done to them, or the actor
withholds something from the person that the person would otherwise have
had.', 132 That is, if KKI had given the subjects a new drug it would have had an
obligation to tell them the risks of the new drug, but because it was not exposing
them to new risks that they would not otherwise encounter by virtue of living in
the units they rented, KKI did not have an obligation to inform them of the risks
associated with their living situation. 33 In the words of KKI, "it was not the study
that presented any risk of harm to Appellants, it was the circumstances in which
Appellants found themselves completely independent of whether they participated
34
in the study."'

1

KKI further argued that, as a legal matter, outside of the landlord-tenant
context or other special relationship, a person "has a duty to warn another of
hazards known to the first person, not the second, only if the first person's conduct
exposed the second person to those hazards."' 35 Because KKI did nothing "to
create or expose Appellants to any lead hazards" KKI argued that it had no duty to
warn them of such hazards.' 36 KKI characterized the duty that appellants would
place upon it as a "duty to rescue," that is, a duty to aid another in time of distress,
and argued that no such duty exists unless the defendant placed the plaintiff in
danger or had a "special relationship" with the plaintiff, 137 neither of which, it
argued, was the case herein. 138
131. In fact, KKI stated in a trial court memo that Ms. Higgins was free not to participate in the
study in which case "the potential for exposure to lead still existed." Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of Response by Kennedy Krieger Institute to Plaintiffs Opposition to KKI's
Motion for Summary Judgment at 10-11, Grimes (No. 1177).
132. Brief of Appellee at 24, Grimes (No. 129).
133. Id. at25.
134. Id. KKI further argued that because the entire purpose of the study was to evaluate the
effectiveness of various abatement levels and there had been little research on the effectiveness of
anything but full abatement, the risks of partial abatement were not known and KKI could not have
adequately warned plaintiff of them. Id.
135. Brief for Appellee at 16, Grimes (No. 129) [citing B.N. v. K.K. , 538 A.2d 1175 (1988)
(providing that a person may be liable for failing to warn another that he has a highly infectious disease
before engaging in sexual relations with that person); see also Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327 (1993)
(holding that a surgeon may be liable for failing to warn his patients that he has AIDS prior to
performing surgery upon them)].
136. Id.
137. Id.at 16-17.
138. KKI further relied on the Restatement's limited list of special relationships and argued that the
relationship between KKI and plaintiffs did not fit within any of these. Brief for Appellee at 17-18,
Grimes (No. 129). These relationships include only 1)common carrier-passenger, 2) innkeeper-guest,
3) landowner-invitee, and 4) certain custodial relationships. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
314A (1965). KKI dismissed appellants' argument that a special relationship existed between the
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Throughout the Opinion there is considerable confusion about the risks
associated with participation in the research study and the risks associated with the
research subject's living situation. The fact that KKI participated in encouraging
the landlords to secure the loans so that they could undertake the different levels of
lead abatement and to recruit families with children muddies the water.' 39 In
addition, the fact that some families were recruited prior to the abatement process,
although not the families who initiated this litigation, and some after, further
complicates the question about when the research began and what constituted the
research interventions.
C. Differences in Facts of the Two Cases
The confusion about which risks were part of the research is further
compounded because the facts of the two cases that were appealed are different
and one seems to fit more neatly under the Court's perspective of the research
project and the other under the researcher's perspective. In the Grimes case, Erika
Grimes' mother moved into the unit in the summer of 1990. The unit was
allegedly completely abated prior to October 1990, after she moved in. Erika
Grimes was not born until May 1992 and Erika's mother agreed to be part of the
study in March 1993. The facts of this case lend themselves more readily to the
view of the researchers that they were simply testing children who already lived in
abated or partially abated units-that is, the subject and her family had been living
in the unit for a number of years prior to any research study and agreed to be part
of the study when they consented to let KKI take dust and blood samples. Thus,
they would have experienced risks as a result of their living arrangements whether
or not they participated in the study. If they had not participated in the study, it is
possible that they would not have known of the risks to their children.
In the Higgins case, in contrast, one could argue that the family was
"recruited" to live in the unit immediately after a level two abatement had been
performed. Ms. Higgins responded to an ad in the newspaper listing the property
as a rental for $315/mo. Under these facts, the Court's view is more plausible that is, that she was recruited to participate in the research study rather than to live
in the unit. Yet, the Court's view is not entirely persuasive given that Ms. Higgins
could have rented the apartment and not participated in the study. Under these

parties because KKI voluntarily assumed to perform a task for the benefit of the plaintiffs and the
plaintiffs relied on such performance. In contrast, KKI argued that it neither expressly nor impliedly
agreed "to undertake any actions that the Appellants were relying on to protect the health of the
occupants of the premises," and therefore did not have a special relationship "created by voluntarily
assumed duties." Brief for Appellee at 19, Grimes (No. 129).
139. If, in contrast, KKI simply identified houses that had had some level of abatement, without
having spoken to the property owners and encouraged them to undertake some type of abatement, and
subsequently contacted the residents about collecting dust samples and testing the blood lead levels in
their children, the Court may have looked on the matter differently.
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latter circumstances it would be difficult to argue that KKI owed any duty to her or
her children.
The factual pattern that fits best with the Court's perspective is that of those
study participants who were recruited prior to having their units undergo abatement
procedures. Under this scenario, arguably, the intervention did include the
abatement process itself and any associated risks. Yet, neither of the litigants in
this case were part of this group. Moreover, the researchers would argue that these
procedures did not impose any additional risks on those living in the units; rather,
they reduced the pre-existing risks.
D. Broad v. Narrow Interpretationof Duty
The different perspectives on when the research was initiated and on the risks
to which the subjects were exposed as a result of participation in the research,
rather than as a result of living in the units, are significant in determining the
implications of the Court's holding. If one views the research protocol broadly,
i.e., as including the risks of living in moderately abated housing, as did the Court,
then the holding is not groundbreaking for future research (although it may have a
significant impact for this case). It would simply require that the researchers
inform the subjects of harms resulting from participation in the research protocolsomething required as part of the federal rules on research with human subjects.
The factual dispute, moreover, would be about compliance with those rules and
whether the researchers did what they said they would do in the informed consent
agreement.1 40 However, if one views the research protocol more narrowly, i.e., as
limited to the risks of taking the dust and blood samples, as most researchers
would, then the holding is much more significant.
It imposes a greater
responsibility on researchers than currently exists to inform subjects of harms to
which the subjects may be exposed that do not necessarily arise from participation
in the research protocol.
VI. THE SCOPE OF THE DUTY
A. Deconstructingthe Scope of the Duty
In Grimes, the Court focused on two aspects of disclosure in considering the
scope of the duty owed by the researchers: 1) disclosure prior to study enrollment,
during the informed consent process, of the risks of living in housing containing
lead paint and alternatives to living in such housing; and 2) disclosure of
information gained during the course of the study, namely results of the dust and

140. While this interpretation of the Opinion would not result in a significantly new legal rule, in
this case, it could result in an obligation of disclosure of information not typically required because of

the interpretation the Court gives to the research intervention.
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blood sample tests,41 although the results of the dust sample tests appear to be
primarily at issue.
The potential breadth of the first of these duties was articulated by appellants
in the Higgins case who argued that the consent form had numerous omissions.
For example, it did not state that the unit in which Catina and Myron Higgins lived
contained lead based paint and high levels of lead in dust and did not explain "the
specific dangers and risks associated with lead poisoning."'142 Nor was Higgins
told that by living in the unit and participating in the Study her son could be
exposed to lead-based dust and could suffer serious and permanent injury as a
result of lead poisoning.1 43 Furthermore, the family was not informed that the unit
was part of a research project until after they had already moved into the test
property.
Specifically, appellants alleged that KKI did not:
* disclose the level of abatement that had been done to the home, nor
identify what was experimental about that abatement level, nor warn
them about the specific areas that had not received any abatement (such
as basements that had flaking and chipping lead paint);
* explain that it was unknown whether the experimental abatement level
would prevent the child from developing lead poisoning;

141. In regard to the disclosure of the dust sample results, appellants pointed out in their brief in the
Higgins case that the researchers, in their consent form, promised to "share with [Ms. Higgins] any new
findings that may develop while [she was] participating in [the] study." Brief for Appellant at 11,
Grimes (No. 1177). Instead, they argued that the first letter KKI sent to Ms. Higgins, with the results of
the initial dust testing (post abatement), failed to warn her "of any areas containing lead dust and gave a
misleading impression that the home did not contain any lead in the dust samples." Id.Moreover, KKI
did not provide the results of the second dust testing results, performed on July 25, 1994, which showed
that the level of lead in the dust "increased in several areas throughout the home above the clearance
criteria in Maryland," until September 14, 1994. Id. By the time the letter reached Ms. Higgins, she
argued, "Myron Higgins was already exposed to high levels of lead in dust and was found to have an
elevated blood lead reading." Id. Appellants further argued that the findings regarding the lead levels in
the dust were relevant to Ms. Higgins' willingness to continue to participate in the study and that KKI
should have confirmed her informed consent to continue participation. As a result of her continued
participation in the study, appellants allege that Myron Higgins developed elevated levels of lead in his
blood. Id.
at 12.
142. Id. at 8. The appellants described these risks as including "permanent cellular destruction and
retardation of cellular development, permanent and severe brain damage, diminution in IQ, leaming
disabilities, extreme difficulty reading, shortened attention span, impulsivity, behavioral and
hyperactivity disorder, visual and spatial motor control problems, diminution in stature," etc. Id.
143. Id. at 9. Appellants further stressed the knowledge of Catina Higgins when she moved into the
unit stating that she was unaware it "ever contained lead-based paint, and in general she was unaware
that older homes contain lead-based paint." Id at 7. And, because her son had not been diagnosed with
elevated blood levels until after he moved into the unit, she had "no experience with or knowledge of
any of the specific dangers associated with exposure to lead-based paint and/or lead in household dust,"
until after moving into the unit. Id.Moreover, she "never understood the real purpose of the study."
Id.at 10. In their brief, appellants reported that Catina was 21 years old when she moved into the unit
and "had no more than obtained a high school education from Baltimore City public schools." Id.at 3.
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inform the parents that their children ran the risk of being lead
poisoned due to [the] presence of lead in the house or the experimental
abatement level being tested;
" explain the serious brain and health damage that lead paint could
cause to preschool-aged children;
" explain, in the consent form, the purpose of the "free blood lead
testing" of the child-to monitor whether the child became lead
poisoned while living at the test property. 144
"

The underlying assumption in this series of omissions is that the research
"intervention" was living in partially lead abated housing, along with the lead
abatement procedure, and the risks were those associated with that intervention.
The federal regulations regarding research with human subjects states that an
intervention "includes both physical procedures by which data are gathered (for
example, venipuncture) and manipulations of the subject or the subject's
environment that are performed for research purposes.' 45 While it is clear, as a
factual matter, that the blood tests and dust sample tests were interventions coming
within the definition of the term in the federal regulations, it is less clear, as a
factual matter, whether the abatement process was an intervention "performed for
research purposes."' 146 While KKI may have encouraged some landlords to
undertake the abatements for the overall design of the research, some of the units
had been abated prior to the research study and, in those cases, the reason for the
abatement was clearly not participation in the research protocol. In cases where
property owners had not undertaken an abatement prior to the initiation of the
study, it is likely that the reason they conducted the renovations was not because of
the research project but rather so that they could get their properties back on the
market and rented.
In addition to the problematic breadth of the initial disclosure requirement
implied by the Court, the requirement raises issues related to the quality of the
information to be disclosed. A duty to disclose the risks associated with living in
housing containing lead paint and in housing that had undergone various levels of
abatement may also have some risks. For example, providing the information too
soon in the research project may result in the sharing of information that is
inaccurate or incomplete and may be unduly alarmist. According to a 1995 report
by the U.S. Department of HUD, intact lead-based paint on most walls and ceilings

144. Brief for Amici Curiae The Public Justice Center, The National Health Law Program, and The
East Harbor Village Center at 27-28, Grimes (No. 129).
145. 45 C.F.R § 46.102(0(2) (2002).
146. Id.
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is not a hazard. 47 KKI asserted in its brief that there is no evidence that "the mere
presence of lead" in homes will lead to lead poisoning. And, according to a fact
sheet by the EPA, "lead paint is usually not a hazard if the paint [1] is in good
condition, and [2] is not on an impact or friction surface (like a window, door or
stair).' 14 8 Arguably, the purpose of the R&M Study was to develop data on
whether partial abatement methods might preserve the intactness of the paint and
prevent deterioration of painted surfaces leading to peeling, flaking or chipping
and thus reduce the incidence of lead poisoning in minor residents.
The second requirement-timely disclosure of the lead dust sample resultsmight be compelling if it were clear that the dust levels were elevated to a level
that was considered hazardous. There was disagreement among the parties,
however, as to whether, as a factual matter, this was the case. 149 The parties were
in dispute regarding the significance of several of the dust sample results. This is a
factual matter that should be determined by the jury when the case is argued on
remand and is key to a finding of liability.
Even if the levels were potentially hazardous, however, this does not resolve
the question of when the researchers should have disclosed the dust sample results
and exactly what they should have told the subjects. These questions raise issues
about the role of researchers versus clinicians and public heath authorities. KKI,
assuming the tests were not to be used as a basis for clinical medical decisionmaking, pointed out that the dust samples were processed it its Trace Metals Lab,
"which typically took several months" and that "the samples were processed for
research purposes, only, with several research-related quality control steps, and
' 50
done in large batches."'

147. Supplemental Brief for Appellee at 2-3, Grimes (No. 129) (citing U.S. DEP'T OF HUD,
GUIDELINES FOR THE EVALUATION AND CONTROL OF LEAD-BASED PAINT HAZARDS IN HOUSING

1-8

(1995).
148. Id. at 2. (citing U.S. DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, FACT SHEET IDENTIFYING LEAD
HAZARDS IN RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES (PUB. No. EPA 747-F-01-002) (2001) at
http://www.epa.gov/lead/leadinfo.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2002). KKI further argued that each of the
study units was left with "paint in good condition and paint on friction surfaces encapsulated after the
intervention." Supplemental Brief of Appellee at 3, Grimes (No. 129).
149. In its brief, KKI attempted to clarify the results of the dust sample tests performed in the
Higgins household. According to KKI, the "results of dust wipes collected in May were below the
Maryland clearance levels," whereas the results of samples collected in July and November "showed
areas above the clearance levels." Brief of Appellee at 8-9, Grimes (No. 129). KKI indicated this in its
letter to Ms. Higgins. According to KKI, appellants were notified of the dust sample test results in
writing. The written notification stated, in part: "The chart below will show the areas where dust was
collected in your home. Remember there is no rule for how much lead is allowed in the dust from a
house like yours. However, we have placed an * next to areas where the amount of lead was higher
than might be found in a completely renovated house." Id. at 8. With respect to those areas with levels
above the clearance levels, it suggested that Ms. Higgins "give those areas special attention" when
cleaning the house. Id. at 9.
150. Brief for Appellee at 7 n.8, Grimes (No. 128).
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Finally, at issue, is the duty of the researchers to disclose the results of the
children's blood tests. That the researchers had a duty to disclose the blood test
results is clear given that they represented, in the informed consent form, that they
would disclose such findings. As in the case of the dust sample results, what is
less clear is when the results should have been disclosed and what obligations the
researchers had in disclosing the information.
B. Dischargingthe Duty-What is Required?
Under either interpretation of the Court's Opinion, that is, if one adopts the
Court's broad view of the research study, or the broad articulation of the duty with
a narrower view of the research, there is a significant question about how each of
the disclosure requirements outlined above would be discharged. Under the
Court's broad view of the research study, the consent form was not adequate
because it did not inform parents that their child might ingest lead dust particles.
This finding assumes that the ingestion was a result of participation in the study
rather than living in the unit. If, on the other hand, one applies the Court's broad
scope of the duty, requiring disclosure of risks which the researcher knows of by
virtue of data he or she is collecting, whether or not the risk is generated by the
research intervention, then one would also be required to disclose the risks to
children of living in housing containing lead paint.
Whether or not this "quantity" of disclosure would be sufficient is also not
entirely clear. Should the researchers also have told the subjects (or potential
subjects) of alternatives to living in lead painted housing or urged them not to live
in units that had not been fully abated? In their brief, appellants asserted that Ms.
Higgins was "never informed [by KKI] that an alternative and scientifically proven
form of treatment to reduce her child's lead exposure would be to remove her son
from the lead infested property and move into a fully abated or lead free home.''.
Such a requirement would undoubtedly mitigate this type of research. As
appellees stated in their brief, "[i]f KKI and other researchers are precluded from
observing others in different situations (which are not the creation of the research
project) in order to learn how to minimize risk to others, then all research will be
' 52
dealt a crippling, if not fatal, blow to the great detriment of our society."'
If the parties had, however, agreed to participate in the research (by living in
one of the experimental units) after the disclosure regarding risks of lead paint to
their children, there remain questions as to the duty of the researchers to inform the
participants of the results of the dust level tests. For example, did the researchers
have a duty to give the participants the results in a more timely manner or to
explain what the levels meant? Did they have a duty to tell them if the dust levels
were higher than what would be found in fully abated houses and, if they were, that
151. Brief for Appellants at 9, Grimes (No. 1177).
152. Brief for Appellee at 21-22, Grimes (No. 129).
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they should take their children to their physicians right away? 53 One might argue,
under the type of duty advocated by the appellants, that researchers should have
had someone come in to take more remedial action or encouraged plaintiffs to
move and assisted them find alternative housing. This type of requirement would
arguably put the researchers in the position of rescuers, placing on them a burden
that our laws do not generally impose on individuals in our society- not even on
our physicians.
Such a requirement is also insensitive to the possibility that the subjects and
their families might not be able to move or to afford to hire someone to perform
additional abatement or remedial action. Such information may actually be
harmful to families if they are, in fact, powerless to change their situation., 54 The
subjects' inability to provide better housing for their children may cause them
extreme anxiety and guilt. Moreover, they could be at risk for a charge of child
abuse or neglect for failure to take action once having the information about the
potential risks to their child.
By creating a private right of action for research subjects, the Court is
ultimately causing a transfer of income from the pockets of the researchers to the
low income individuals who are often participants in research studies of this kind.
With the income such subjects obtain from these judgments, perhaps they will be
able to move to better housing that has no lead paint. Although this outcome
seems right, the allocation of such sweeping responsibilities to the research
community seems misplaced.
VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH AND
COMPENSATION OF INJURED PARTIES
If the Court's Opinion goes beyond informing research subjects of the risks
imposed by the research protocol (narrowly defined) and requires a duty to warn of
harms related to a subject's living conditions, or other factors not the result of
153. KKI did not tell them to take their child to their physician at this point but when the blood test
levels came back above normal the notice told the child's mother that she "should provide the test result
to [her] child's primary health care provider right away." Brief for Appellee at 9, Grimes (No. 128).
See also Brief for Appellee at 9, Grimes (No. 129).
154. MD CODE ANN. ENVIR §§ 6-839, 840(a)(2)(i). At the time of this case there was no significant
monetary assistance available to families whose children were found to have elevated levels of lead in
their blood so that they could relocate. Subsequently, as part of the Reduction of Lead Risk in Housing
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4851-4856 (2000), if a landlord has complied with the lead risk reduction
requirements of the law, see supra note 27, but has notice that a child living in one of his units has
blood lead levels above a certain threshold amount, the landlord may not be liable for negligence if he
makes an offer to the occupants to assist them relocate their household to lead-safe housing either
permanently or temporarily, while the affected unit is renovated, and to pay reasonable expenses for the
medically necessary treatments of the affected child.
155. While the Opinion exposes researchers to liability, tenants may also still sue landlords for
violation of Maryland common law or relevant statute. As a result, in similar circumstances, landlords
and researchers could be jointly and severally liable.

2002]

WHOSE DUTY IS IT ANYWAY?

participation in a research protocol, but about which the researcher may know or
have expertise, then the holding would have far reaching consequences for many
types of research. The holding would also affect the compensation of individuals
harmed by participation in research or as a result of exposure to public health risks.
The holding is particularly relevant to public health and environmental
studies. Consider, for example, research on malnutrition. Could a researcher study
a population that exposes its children to a diet without certain nutrients or would
the researcher be required to tell the subjects of the risks of such a diet and urge
them to change their diet or see their physician? If families agreed to be part of the
study, when the researchers found, each day, that the child's diet was deficient in
essential nutrients, would they be required to tell the family immediately? If they
did not tell the family, but later the child was found to have organ damage as a
result of their diet, could the parents successfully sue the researchers for failure to
tell them of their observational findings that the child's diet each day had been
deficient in these essential nutrients? If the researchers had noted some harmful
effects on the health of the children, would they have a duty to tell the parents and
urge them to take the children to their family doctor? If the parents did not take the
children to the doctor would the researchers have any obligation to report the
parents for child neglect?
Alternatively, consider research on the effects of second-hand smoke on
children living in housing with parents who smoke. Should it be the obligation of
the researchers to inform the parents at the start of the research of the risks to
children of second-hand smoke? Should they be required to tell them every time
they find a level of smoke in the air that might be hazardous? If the parents do not
change their smoking habits, should the researchers be required to report them for
child abuse or neglect?
Much of our public health research is of the nature that we are studying the
risks to health status of certain diets or life styles or environmental factors, e.g.,
living close to a nuclear power plant. This type of research is significantly
different from clinical research trials by virtue of its focus and objectives. As
articulated by public health experts, public health research and practice focus on:
" the health and safety of populations rather than the health of individual
patients;
* prevention of injury and disease rather than treatment and care;
* relationships between the government and the community rather than
the physician and patient; and
" population-based services grounded on the scientific methodologies of
public health (e.g.,56biostatistics and epidemiology) rather than personal
medical services.1

156. Lawrence 0. Gostin, Public Health Law: A Renaissance 30 J. OF L., MED. & ETHICs 136, 136
(2002).
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These differences are significant for how we think about the obligations of
public health researchers. It is ironic, for example, that the results of the R&M
Study may have provided evidence of the need for changes in our laws and policies
regarding lead paint abatement. A sweeping duty requirement could significantly
inhibit this type of research.
Of course, the real danger of the Court's Opinion is the possibility that it will
significantly reduce major public health studies that could be the basis for revising
our public health and environmental laws and practices that would protect the very
population the Court seems so concerned about in its Opinion. 157 A further
negative consequence of an atrophied public health research enterprise is the
difficulty it may impose on individuals seeking compensation for harms related to
public health research or simply for harms resulting from exposure to unsafe
environmental substances. Not only will plaintiffs have to show that defendants
owed them a duty of care, in addition they will have to prove that the exposure to
the harmful substance caused their injuries. Without the relevant epidemiological
data to show causation such plaintiffs will leave the courtroom empty handed.
This outcome undermines the primary societal goals of tort law-compensation of
the injured party and deterrence of risky behavior.
Ideally, the holding in this case would lead to the conduct of safer research
studies rather than significantly fewer studies. Instead, the indeterminacy of the
meaning of the Court's decision coupled with greater and more costly research
burdens and the potential for significant liability will arguably have a chilling
effect on the conduct of future public health studies. This, in turn, will have a
detrimental effect on progress in the field of public health and may, inadvertently,
limit the ability of plaintiffs through the tort system to receive compensation for
public health harms or to force changes in public health practices.
From our perspective, the Court's Opinion might have better achieved the
goal of safer research if it had been clearer in its articulation of the duty required of
the researchers. Such a duty would clearly include those established by the federal
regulations on human subjects research. If the Court felt compelled to go beyond
these well established duties and impose a duty to warn of harms that do not arise
out of the research interventions, factors that would be relevant to the imposition of
such a duty might include whether: 1) the researchers have an ongoing relationship
with the subjects and the information is gained during the time that there is contact
between researcher and subject; 2) the researchers, as compared to the subjects,

157. As a matter of public policy, KKI argued that the obligation appellants were seeking to impose
on it would "effectively end the worthwhile research being conducted to find cost-effective ways to
minimize lead paint poisoning, as well as many other types of research." Brief of Appellee at 20,
Grimes (No. 129). KKI further pointed to the General Assembly's statement that it is vitally important
to "reduce the incidence of childhood lead poisoning, while maintaining the stock of available rental
housing." MD. CODE ANN. ENVIR. § 6-802 (2000).
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have the means to measure the risk at issue and have superior knowledge of that
risk; 3) the risk poses a serious threat to life or health; 4) the potential harm is
imminent and will occur without intervention; and 5) there is an effective
intervention.
VIII. CONCLUSION - A HOLLOW VICTORY?
It is too early to tell how the lower courts will interpret the Court of Appeals
decision in the Kennedy Krieger case and perhaps we are raising the specter of
consequences that are far beyond what the Court intended. Nonetheless, the Court
seems to be raising the odds of liability for researchers, and in the end, it may be a
hollow victory for research subjects. Although the Court has made clear that there
will generally be a duty on the part of researchers, the fact that the duty is so
unclear and difficult to understand may mean that much less research of this sort
will be carried out. If this is true, for the research that is carried out, plaintiffs may
be unsuccessful because although they have established a duty, they will not have
the empirical data necessary to prove causation. By creating a legal environment
in which it is perceived as too risky to engage in such research, we may be denied
information that not only might help future generations, but also might help future
plaintiffs.

